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ABSTRACT 
Recent high-profile financial scandals and increasing instances of restatements focus 
public attention on the role of audit committees, auditors and CFOs in maintaining the integrity 
and quality of corporate financial reporting. The U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) in July 2002, and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ Stock 
Market, Inc. (Nasdaq) changed their listing requirements in 2004 to encourage more effective 
corporate governance in order to protect the integrity of the financial reporting system.  
The purpose of my dissertation is to examine monitoring of financial reporting by 
corporate directors. My dissertation, entitled “Three Essay on Monitoring of Financial Reporting 
by Corporate Directors” examines how boards strengthen corporate governance through the 
formation of audit committees, the choice of external auditors, and the hiring of new CFOs. 
Study one proposes and tests two models explaining what factors affect the existence of 
designated audit committees and the extent of audit committee financial expertise at IPOs. Study 
two investigates factors impacting IPO firms’ choice of an industry expert audit. Study three 
examines whether restatement companies experiencing chief financial officer (CFO) turnover 
hire new CFOs with more financial expertise. 
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Audit Committee Formation at the IPO: Existence and Financial Expertise 
ABSTRACT: Audit committee formation is of great importance in corporation governance. Overtime, 
regulators, shareholder, and investors have called for improvement in the monitoring service provided 
by audit committees. In this paper, we propose and test two models explaining what factors affect the 
existence of designated audit committees and the extent of audit committee financial expertise at IPOs. 
Our results show that foreign operations, industry concentration, CEO shareholdings, venture capital 
presence, underwriter ranking, the board size, and the percentage of outside directors are positively 
associated with the likelihood that companies have audit committees established before IPOs. Firm 
size is negatively associated with designation of audit committees pre-IPO. Results also show that IPO 
firms that have larger size, foreign operations, greater growth opportunity, less CEO power, the 
presence of venture capital, higher underwriter ranking, and more independent board members have 
greater proportions of audit committee members with financial expertise. These results provide new 
evidence on an important choice in the literature that seeks to understand factors related to audit 
committee formation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate boards are often the focus of efforts to improve corporate governance. After a series of 
high-profile accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002, and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq 
Stock Market, Inc. (Nasdaq) changed their listing requirements in 2004 to encourage more effective 
corporate governance in order to protect the integrity of the financial reporting system. Given the 
critical role of corporate audit committees in overseeing the financial reporting process, both SOX and 
related listing requirements of the major stock exchanges contain regulations intended to improve the 
conduct of audit committees.
1
 The audit committee oversees corporate financial reporting by meeting 
regularly with the firm’s outside auditors and internal financial managers to review the corporation’s 
financial statements, audit process, and internal accounting controls. The regulations aim to improve 
the effectiveness of audit committees, yet such improvement can also result from individual company 
initiatives. No study to date explores how companies establish the effectiveness of their audit 
committees without regulatory intervention. The purpose of this paper is to investigate determinants 
associated with the establishment of an audit committee and the financial expertise of the audit 
committee under a unique setting – a firm’s initial public offering (IPO). 
We examine the determinants of audit committee formation at the IPO for the following three 
reasons. First, prior research studying audit committees has focused on characteristics of existing audit 
committees. Factors associated with establishing new audit committees have not been investigated. 
The IPO provides a unique setting to examine these issues because firms completing an IPO have a 
one-year phase-in period to establish a full independent audit committee (NYSE Listed Company 
                                                             
1 For example, Section 407 of SOX (Disclosure of Audit Committee Financial Expert) requires the SEC to adopt rules 
mandating that audit committees of public firms must comprise at least one member who is a financial expert, or 
otherwise disclose reasons for not adopting this requirement. Under both NYSE’s Section 303A and Nasdaq’s Listing 
Rule 5600 Series rules, the audit committee must have at least three directors, all of whom must meet independence 
requirements, and at least one member must have accounting or related financial management expertise.   
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Manual Section 303A and Nasdaq Corporate Governance Rules & the Interpretative Process).
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Venkataraman et al. (2008) find 22.4% of IPO firms during 2000-2002 do not have an audit committee 
at the time of the IPO. Therefore, the IPO provides a natural setting to examine why some firms 
choose not to have audit committees when they go public and if they choose to have one how they 
establish it. 
Second, the IPO is a particularly rich setting for studying board issues because the IPO is the first 
time that most private firms raise equity from dispersed investors and begin to comply with public 
firms’ filing requirements. Therefore, the IPO is normally associated with a significant change in the 
firm’s corporate governance (Baker and Gompers 2003). The formation of the audit committee is 
likely to reflect such change. In addition, the formation of the audit committee at the IPO is expected 
to reflect a value-maximizing decision of IPO company insiders. As Gertner and Kaplan (1996) point 
out, firms undertaking a public offering are more likely to choose value-maximizing governance 
features than already-public firms because the selling insiders directly bear the financial effects of 
such features. Therefore, we choose such a setting to shed light on board structure at an early state. 
Finally, prior research has extensively examined the consequences associated with effective audit 
committees, such as audit committee independence and audit committee financial expertise (e.g., 
Abbott et al. 2004, Carcello et al. 2003 and 2006, and Zhang et al.  2007). The only study on the 
determinants of audit committee effectiveness is Klein (2002), which examines the determinants of 
audit committee independence. Prior studies have not investigated determinants of audit committee 
financial expertise, which has been widely documented to be associated with better financial reporting 
                                                             
2 http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303Afaqs.pdf  and 
https://listingcenter.nasdaqomx.com/Show_Doc.aspx?File=FAQsCorpGov.html 
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quality. Thus, investigating the determinants of audit committee financial expertise should be 
informative to investors and regulators.  
We study a sample of 659 IPO firms during the period of 2000-2010. We hand-collect audit 
committee information from the offering prospectuses (S-1 files). There have been variations in the 
definition of audit committee financial expert across time. The SEC adopted the initial definition of 
financial expertise in Section 407 of SOX, which only referred to prior accounting-related experience 
with SEC financial reporting.  Qualifying work experiences included serving as a public accountant, 
auditor, principal financial or accounting officer, or controller. Some observers argued that this 
provision narrowed the pool of candidates qualified to serve as financial experts. In response, the SEC 
adopted a broader definition of financial expert for its final rules. The definition now allows for 
experience actively supervising a principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, controller, 
public accountant, auditor or person performing similar functions. This definition qualifies CEOs or 
company presidents as financial experts. The revised SEC definition also allows for experience 
assessing the performance of companies or relevant similar experience (such as being an investment 
banker or venture capitalist) (SEC 2003).
3
 However, academic research generally finds that only 
financial expertise under the narrow definition (both accounting experience and CFO working 
experience) is persistently and positively associated with audit committee effectiveness (Carcello and 
Neal 2003; Defond et al. 2005; Carcello et al. 2006; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). Thus, we adopt 
the narrow definition of financial expert in this study.  
We group existing theories about corporate board structure into three non-mutually exclusive 
hypotheses to examine the determinants of the establishment of an audit committee and the financial 
expertise of the audit committee at the IPO. First, under the scope of operations hypothesis, the board 
                                                             
3 http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm 
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structure is driven by the scope and complexity of the firm’s operations (Fama and Jensen 1983; Coles 
et al. 2008a; Lehn et al. 2009). The second hypothesis is that audit committee formation is the 
outcome of agency problems. We refer to this as the agency hypothesis. The third hypothesis, the 
negotiation hypothesis, states that audit committee formation results from a negotiation between the 
firm’s CEO and its outside board members.  
Our results provide mixed support for the three hypotheses. First, we find that measures of the 
scope and complexity of the firm’s operations are positively associated with the early formation of the 
audit committee. For example, foreign operations are positively related to the likelihood that a firm 
will have an audit committee established at the IPO. Larger firms, firms with greater growth 
opportunity, and those having foreign operations are more likely to have audit committee financial 
expertise at the IPO. Thus, as private firms grow in scope and complexity of operations, they are more 
likely to set up their audit committees and to add more financial experts into them.  
 Second, audit committee existence is positively related to industry concentration, a measure of 
the private benefits available to insiders, and to CEO ownership, an interest alignment measure. This is 
consistent with the prediction, developed from the arguments forwarded by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Berger and Hannan (1998), that audit committee existence is positively associated with 
high agency costs. However, we find no evidence that the financial expertise of audit committee 
members is related to the agency costs. 
Third, both the existence of audit committees and the audit committee financial expertise are 
positively related to the constraints on CEO influence, such as the presence of a venture capitalist, the 
reputation of the firm’s investment bank at the time of its IPO, the number of board members, and the 
proportion of outside directors on the board. In addition, the financial expertise of audit committee 
11 
 
members is negatively related to measures of the CEO’s influence, including CEO/chairman duality, 
and job tenure. Our results are consistent with the theory proposed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) 
that corporate boards reflect the outcome of a negotiation between the self-interested CEO and outside 
board members. 
Additional analyses reveal that passage of SOX is marginally associated with an increase in 
IPO audit committee financial expertise but is not associated with the early formation of audit 
committees.    
Our paper contributes to research on corporate board structure. Specifically, we investigate the 
formation and financial expertise of audit committees. Several studies have examined the determinants 
of general board composition, such as board size and board independence (e.g. Boone et al. 2007; 
Linck et al. 2008; Lehn et al. 2009). Despite the important role of the audit committee in monitoring 
corporate financial reporting, only one study examines which economic factors affect audit committee 
composition. Klein (2002) finds that some board characteristics and firm characteristics affect audit 
committee independence. However, little is known about non-regulatory incentives to establish an 
audit committee and to have financial experts on the audit committee. These issues are important 
especially given the widely documented positive effect of audit committee financial expertise on 
financial reporting quality (Abbott et al. 2004; Abbott et al. 2003; Aier et al. 2005; Krishnan 2005; Lee 
et al. 2004). This paper fills the gap by providing empirical evidence on the determinants of audit 
committee establishment and financial expertise. 
Our paper focuses on IPO firms, a setting where audit committee existence and financial 
expertise are not mandatory, thus allowing for a greater variability in governance structures across 
firms. Examining the audit committee formation for IPO firms also addresses a concern voiced by 
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Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) that most research on corporate boards has been limited to large, 
established companies. Moreover, IPO firms have unique and important stakeholders, such as venture 
capitalists and investment bankers. Thus, our study contributes to the literature by providing empirical 
evidence on how those unique players help shape firms’ audit committee structure.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we provide brief reviews of the 
literatures, and then turn to a discussion on how they impact audit committee formation and financial 
expertise in the IPO setting. This discussion provides the academic theory underlying the development 
of our conceptual models of determinants of audit committee existence and financial expertise at IPOs. 
We describe the research design in Section III and present the results in Section IV. Section V 
provides discussion on the results and concludes the paper.  
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Board Composition 
 Boards play a vital role in corporate governance. Studies investigating board composition 
largely focus only on the size and independence of boards. Several papers argue that small boards 
operate more effectively than large boards because of the high coordination costs and free-rider 
problems associated with large boards (Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Harris and Raviv 2008). Empirical 
studies examining the determinants of board size find it increases with asset tangibility, firm size, 
diversity of operations, and market-to-book ratio (Baker and Gompers 2003; Boone et al. 2007; Coles 
et al. 2008), but decreases with growth opportunities, stock return volatility, and CEO ownership (Mak 
and Roush 2000; Boone et al. 2007; Linck et al. 2008).  
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Independence is the other characteristic of board composition frequently examined by the 
literature. To strengthen corporate governance, regulations promoting specific board guidelines, such 
as SOX, typically call for greater outside representation. Most research finds that independence is 
necessary for the monitoring role taken by the board, and is the outcome of a negotiation between 
management and the board (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). Anderson et al. (2000) and Coles et al. 
(2008b) argue that diversified firms deploy more independent directors to monitor complex operations 
and oversee managers’ performance. These arguments are supported by the empirical findings of Lehn 
et al. (2009) and Boone et al. (2007). Boone et al. (2007) also provide evidence that the proportion of 
independent directors increases as firms grow while decreasing with  the CEO’s influence.  
Audit Committee Existence, Size, and Independence 
A well-functioning audit committee safeguards the independence of the auditor and imposes 
discipline on the financial reporting processes. Despite its important role in the assurance of corporate 
financial reporting, we know little about the formation and initial composition of audit committees.  
Beginning in 2004, Section 205 of the SOX Act of 2002 specifies that if no separate audit committee 
is designated, the entire board of directors acts as the audit committee. However, the full board does 
not meet SEC and exchange independence requirements for audit committees because it includes 
managers and other insiders. Thus, mature firms have designated audit committees comprised of 
subsets of their full boards. To our best knowledge, Klein  (2002) conducts the first, and so far the 
only, empirical study examining what firm characteristics determine the independence of audit 
committees of mature firms.
4
  Subsequent to the passage of SOX 2002, the NYSE amended its listing 
rules in 2004 to require that designated audit committees have a minimum of three members. All are 
                                                             
4 Her main findings suggest that audit committee independence increases with board size and board independence and 
decreases with firms’ growth opportunities. Firms reporting consecutive losses also have less independent audit 
committees. 
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required to be independent unless the company is exempted. Given the prevailing independence of 
audit committee members since SOX, we focus on the financial expertise of audit committee members, 
for which rules are much more flexible. 
Financial Expertise of Audit Committee Members 
Financial expertise of audit committee members is another important characteristic which 
contributes to the effective functioning of audit committees. In 1998, the chairman of the SEC, Arthur 
Levitt, gave a speech decrying the low quality of financial reporting numbers, especially earnings 
(Levitt, 1998). In response, the NYSE and NASD sponsored a Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) to 
study the issues. The Committee recommended that at least one member of a company’s audit 
committee should have accounting or related financial management expertise (BRC, 1999).
5
 The 
NYSE and NASD adopted this recommendation. The exchanges’ rules provided that this requirement 
could be satisfied either by a member having knowledge of GAAP obtained from experience as an 
accountant, auditor or CFO, or by someone having experience in supervising or assessing the 
performance of accountants or auditors, such as company presidents, CEOs, or investment bankers.
6
  
After a series of high profile corporate accounting scandals, more specific requirements on the 
audit committee structure became effective. For instance, Section 407 of SOX requires that public 
firms’ audit committees must include at least one member who is a financial expert or, otherwise, 
must disclose reasons for not doing so. This arguably increases pressure on companies to appoint 
financial experts to their audit committees. The initial definition of financial expertise in Section 407 
                                                             
5 http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Blue_Ribbon_Panel.pdf 
6 The NYSE (2012, section 303A.07.a) requires that each member of the AC be (or become) financially literate. The 
financial literacy qualification is interpreted by the listed company’s board of directors. The standard of financial literacy is 
less stringent than the standard for financial expertise employed in this study because it includes non-accounting financial 
expertise, such as experience supervising accountants and auditors. 
(http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/Help/mapContent.asp?sec=lcm-sections&title=sx-ruling-nyse-
policymanual_303A.07&id=chp_1_4_3_8) 
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of SOX only referred to education and experience in accounting and auditing. Some observers argued 
that provision narrows the pool of candidates qualified to serve as financial experts. In response, the 
SEC adopted a broader definition of financial expert for its final rules, similar to the provisions of the 
NYSE and NASD. In addition to experience in accounting and auditing , the SEC’s definition of 
financial expert now allows for experience in supervising employees with financial responsibilities 
and overseeing the performance of companies (such as being a CEO or company president), as well 
as experience in financial services (such as being a banker or venture capitalist) .  
We choose to study the narrowly defined financial expertise (i.e. accounting or auditing 
education and work experience) since the literature documents that audit committees having members 
with this expertise are associated with improved financial reporting quality. For example, a number of 
studies demonstrate that firms with narrowly defined financial experts serving on the audit committee 
are less likely to restate earnings (Abbot et al. 2004), and less likely to manage earnings (Carcello et 
al. 2006; Dhaliwal et al. 2006; Xie et al. 2003). However, research provides mixed evidence on the 
effectiveness of broadly defined financial expertise in promoting improved financial reporting 
(Carcello and Neal 2003; Defond et al. 2005; Park and Shin 2004; Goh 2009). Although Goh (2009) 
finds that audit committees with greater nonaccounting financial expertise remediate internal control 
material weakness more rapidly, several other studies fail to provide evidence that financial expertise 
under the broad definition positively influences audit committee effectiveness (Carcello and Neal 
2003; Defond et al. 2005; Carcello et al. 2006; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008). Therefore, we adopt 
narrowly defined financial expertise in this study. 
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Audit Committees at IPOs 
Our paper extends the literature by exploring the formation and financial expertise of 
designated audit committees at the IPO. Specifically, we examine the existence of designated audit 
committees and the nature of financial expertise of the audit committee when companies initially go 
public. As we discussed earlier, the IPO represents an important corporate event because it is the first 
time that most private firms raise equity from dispersed investors and begin to comply with public 
firms’ filing requirements. Therefore, establishing effective corporate governance that ensures 
reporting quality to protect shareholders’ interest is important at IPOs. The audit committee and the 
financial expertise of audit committee members should play an important role as a governance 
mechanism for overseeing IPO firms’ financial reporting.  
Some IPO companies do not have designated audit committees during the first year post-IPO 
because companies completing an IPO have a one-year phase-in period in which to comply with the 
requirements governing audit committees (see the examples in the Appendix). SEC rules require only 
one fully independent audit committee member at IPO, a majority of independent members within 90 
days, and a fully independent audit committee within one year. Major stock exchange rules are similar 
(NYSE 303A.07 Audit Committee Additional Requirements; Nasdaq Listing Rule 5600 Series). 
Furthermore, there is no requirement that audit committees be separately designated. The entire board 
can function as an undesignated audit committee. Venkataraman et al. (2008) report that 78.6 percent 
of 350 IPO firms during 2000-2002 make reference to specific individuals as being current members 
of an audit committee in the prospectuses while the remaining 22.4 percent do not. Thus, IPOs provide 
a natural setting for us to investigate the factors associated with the establishment of designated audit 
committees at the initial IPO and the presence of financial experts on the audit committee. 
17 
 
We now turn to three theories about board formation (the scope of operations theory; the 
agency theory; and the negotiation theory) to propose the determinants of the existence and financial 
expertise of audit committees at IPOs. 
 Determinants of Existence and Financial Expertise of the Audit Committee at IPOs 
The scope of operations hypothesis 
We propose that the scope of a firm’s operations determine the existence and financial expertise of the 
audit committee at IPO. Although prior research primarily focuses on the impact of scope of 
operations on board size and independence, we argue that the scope of operations hypothesis also 
applies to existence of designated audit committees and to audit committee financial expertise. The 
scope of operations hypothesis refers to the view that the scope and complexity of production 
processes affect corporate governance: larger or more complex processes tend to require larger and 
more independent boards (Fama and Jensen 1983; Coles et al. 2008a). Consistent with this view, 
Boone et al. (2007) and Lehn et al. (2009) argue that more diversified firms require more board 
services and more monitoring because they have more significant agency problems and wider scope of 
operations. Similarly, Linck et al. (2008) argue that larger boards represent a wider range of expertise 
and document that board size and independence increase with firm complexity. Klein (2002) also 
suggests that high-growth opportunity firms face more uncertainty and require more expertise in the 
audit committee. We expect that IPO companies having larger or more complex processes will tend to 
provide designated audit committees and greater audit committee financial expertise at IPO. In 
empirical tests, we use four measures to proxy for the firm’s scope and complexity: the firm’s size, age, 
the existence of foreign operations, and growth opportunities.   
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H1a: The existence of a designated audit committee at the IPO is positively related to operational 
complexity and scope. 
 H1b: The extent of audit committee financial expertise is positively related to operational complexity 
and scope. 
The agency costs hypothesis  
Agency theory posits an inherent moral hazard problem in principal-agent (owner-manager) 
relations that gives rise to agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) put forward managerial 
ownership as an internal control mechanism for agency problems. Under the interest alignment 
argument, owner-managers have an opportunity for entrepreneurial gains so they have incentives to 
increase the value of the firm.
7
 Boone et al. (2007) and Linck et al. (2008) find that CEO ownership is 
negatively related to board size and board independence. It follows from this argument that firms with 
higher levels of manager ownership would have less need for the monitoring provided by audit 
committees than would firms with lower levels of manager ownership, assuming a "convergence of 
interests" as manager ownership increases.  
However, under a countervailing argument, called managerial entrenchment, high CEO 
ownership can decrease firm value (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985; Shivdasani 1993; Stulz 1988). 
Denis et al. (1997) find that CEO ownership is negatively related to the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
Lins (2003) documents that top management ownership reduces firm value in emerging markets. 
Therefore, we argue that CEO ownership will motivate the CEO to manipulate financial reporting to 
pursue private interests at the expense of shareholders, so that effective monitoring by audit 
                                                             
7 The argument states that managerial ownership is positively related to firm performance because the alignment of the 
interests of managers and shareholders reduces agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
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committees is necessary. We expect CEO ownership is positively related to the existence of an audit 
committee and the extent of an audit committee financial expertise.  
In addition, the models developed by Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2008) suggest that 
agency costs increase with managers’ opportunities to consume private benefits. Thus, the 
establishment of an audit committee and financial expertise of the audit committee should be 
positively related to managers’ private opportunities. We use two measures of managers’ potential 
private benefits to test the agency costs hypothesis: the firm’s free cash flow and a Herfindahl measure 
of industry concentration. Jensen (1986) argues that managers are more likely to exploit private 
benefits in firms with more free cash flow because free cash flow is under the direct control of 
managers.  Berger and Hannan (1998) document that the lack of market discipline resulting from high 
levels of market concentration allows managers to take part of the benefits of concentration not as 
higher profits, but in the form of a ‘‘quiet life,’’ in which they do not work hard to keep costs under 
control.    
H2a The existence of an audit committee at the IPO is positively related to agency costs (negatively 
related to inverse proxies for agency costs). 
H2b: The extent of audit committee financial expertise at the IPO is positively related to agency costs 
(negatively related to inverse proxies for agency costs). 
The negotiation hypothesis  
The negotiation hypothesis states that the board structure is the outcome of a negotiation between 
the CEO and outsiders (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). In this view, a powerful CEO influences the 
composition and function of the board by placing insiders and affiliated outsiders on it. Consistent 
with this, Boone et al. (2007) show that the CEO’s influence is negatively related to the proportion of 
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independent board members. Carcello et al. (2011) find CEOs sitting on the nominating committee 
negatively affect the effectiveness of the monitoring role of the audit committee. Therefore, we argue 
that the CEO’s influence is negatively related with the existence and financial expertise of an audit 
committee, while constraints on the CEO’s influence are positively related to the existence and 
financial expertise of an audit committee. We use three measures of the CEO’s influence in our 
empirical tests: the CEO’s job tenure, and two dummy variables that represent whether the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board and a founder of the firm. Measures of constraints on this influence 
consist of a dummy variable that represents the presence of a venture capital investor at the time of the 
IPO, and the Carter and Manaster (1990) ranking of the reputation of the firm’s investment banker at 
the time of its IPO.  
The CEO’s financial expertise is another factor that could impact the formation of the audit 
committee. The CEO’s financial expertise could proxy for either the CEO’s influence or a constraint 
on this influence. On the one side, CEOs with financial expertise could have higher professional 
competence and ethics, continuing education, and reputation, which might constrain the CEOs’ self-
serving behavior. On the other side, CEOs with financial expertise might wish to use their financial 
expertise to manipulate accounting reports. Feng et al. (2011) find that CFOs of firms engaging in 
irregularities are more likely to be CPAs than those of control firms, which suggests that CEOs with 
financial expertise are better able to come up with accounting schemes to boost earnings. Therefore, 
we have no directional prediction on the relation between CEO financial expertise and the existence 
and financial expertise of an audit committee at the IPO.    
H3a: The existence of an audit committee at the IPO is negatively related to CEOs’ influence and 
positively related to constraints on this influence. 
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H3b: The extent of audit committee financial expertise is negatively related to CEOs’ influence and 
positively related to constraints on this influence. 
   
III. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH MODEL 
Sample  
We start with all initial public offerings of common equity reported in the SDC/Platinum New 
Issue database during the period between 2000 and 2009. Adopting criteria that are common in the 
empirical IPO literature (Chemmanur and Paeglis 2005; Boone et al. 2007), we eliminate REITs, 
closed-end funds, unit offerings, financial firms (all firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and 
utility firms (all firms with SIC codes between 4900 and 4949), leveraged buyouts (LBO), roll-ups, 
IPOs having offer price less than 5 dollars, and foreign companies. We then delete offerings listed on 
non-US public marketplaces, foreign firms, and firms not covered by Compustat. Finally, we eliminate 
offerings with missing prospectuses, missing management and board information, and missing 
financial data, yielding a final sample of 659 firms. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. 
We then collect CEOs, CFOs, board, and ownership data on the sample firms at the IPO from the 
offering prospectuses (S-1 files). The prospectuses are obtained from the SEC’s Edgar database. Audit 
committee members’ financial expertise is measured in the fiscal year in which the IPO occurs. We 
code each audit committee member’s financial expertise into one of the following categories:
8
 (1) 
specific accounting experience as a CPA or in public accounting; (2) work experience as a chief 
financial officer, vice-president of finance, or controller; (3) work experience as an investment banker, 
financial analyst, venture capitalist, or any other financial management roles; and, (4) work experience 
                                                             
8 We follow the categories of financial expertise classified by Naiker and Sharma (2009) who adopt the most detailed 
categories on audit committee financial expertise. 
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as a chief executive officer or company president. We code accounting financial expertise (the narrow 
definition) equal to one if an audit committee member has experience in either category (1) or (2). We 
also conduct additional analyses by incorporating non-accounting financial expertise (the broad 
definition) in which we code financial expertise equal to one if an audit committee member has 
experience in any one of the four categories above. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Research Model 
Determinants of the existence and financial expertise of an audit committee at the IPO 
First, to examine the determinants of an IPO firm’s choice to establish an audit committee, we 
use a logit model with the dependent variable, AC, which equals one if a given IPO firm has an audit 
committee prior to its IPO and 0 otherwise. Second, to examine the determinants of an IPO firm’s 
choice of financial expertise on the audit committee, we restrict our sample to firms that established an 
audit committee. We employ an OLS regression model with the dependent variable, ACFE%, equaling 
the proportion of financial experts on the audit committee. Independent variables represent factors that 
are hypothesized to affect the IPO firm’s choice to establish an audit committee or appoint financial 
experts.  
The scope of operations hypothesis 
We use firm size, firm age, growth opportunity, and foreign operations to proxy for the scope 
and complexity of a firm’s operations. The scope of operations hypothesis predicts that the existence 
of an audit committee and its financial expertise are positively related to all four measures. Firm size 
(LNAT) is measured as the natural log of total assets. Firm age (FMAGE) is calculated as the number 
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of years since the firm was founded.
9
 Growth opportunity (GRWOPP) is measured as the market value 
of equity plus book value of total debt, divided by total assets. Foreign operations (FOREIGN) is 
measured as an indicator variable that equals one if a firm has pretax foreign income, and zero 
otherwise.  
The agency costs hypothesis  
We use three variables to test the agency costs hypothesis. CEO shareholdings (CEOHD), is 
measured as the proportion of outstanding common shares held by the CEO prior to the offerings. 
CEO ownership proxies for the convergence of interests between agents and principals, thus it is an 
inverse proxy for agency costs. The other two measures proxy for managers’ opportunities for private 
benefit. Free cash flow (FREECF) is measured as the firms’ earnings plus depreciation minus capital 
expenditures, scaled by assets. Firms in more concentrated industries face greater agency costs due to 
the increased likelihood that CEOs will pursue private benefits (Linck et al. 2008). Herfindahl index of 
industry sales (HHI) based on all firms on Compustat is used to measure industry concentration. The 
agency costs hypothesis predicts that the existence of an audit committee and its financial expertise are 
negatively related to CEO ownership (due to interest alignment) and positively related to free cash 
flow and industry concentration. The managerial entrenchment hypothesis predicts that the existence 
of an audit committee and its financial expertise are positively related to CEO ownership and 
positively related to free cash flow and industry concentration. Due to the existence of the two 
countervailing effects of interest alignment and managerial entrenchment, we make no directional 
prediction of the coefficient for CEO ownership (CEOHD)    
 
                                                             
9 Founding dates are obtained from the Field-Ritter dataset (Field and Karpoff 2002; Loughran and Ritter 2004).  
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The negotiation hypothesis  
We use two sets of variables to test whether the existence of an audit committee and its financial 
expertise reflect a negotiation between the CEO and outside board members. Three dummy variables, 
CEO tenure, CEO duality (holding the chair position), and a CEO founder variable represent the 
CEO’s influence in the negotiation. CEO tenure equals one if the number of years in which the CEO 
has held the CEO position in the firm is greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise. CEO 
chair equals one if the CEO is the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. CEO founder equals one 
if the CEO is the founder of the IPO firm, and zero otherwise. We use a combination variable, 
CEO_POWER, to capture the overall effect of the above three variables. CEO_POWER is the sum of 
CEO tenure, CEO duality, and CEO founder. Higher values of the CEO power variable imply greater 
CEO influence on the board.  
Venture capital investment and investment bank reputation measure the constraints on the CEO’s 
influence. The venture capital dummy variable (VC) is set to one if a venture capital investor owns an 
equity stake at the IPO, and investment bank reputation (UWRANK) is measured by the bank’s Carter-
Manaster (1990) rank at the time of the firm’s IPO. The negotiation hypothesis predicts that the 
existence of an audit committee and its financial expertise are negatively related to CEO power, and 
positively related to venture capital investment and investment bank reputation. 
To proxy for financial expertise of CEOs, we use a dummy, equal to 1 if the CEO has work 
experience as an accountant, auditor, controller, chief accounting officer or CFO; otherwise 0.
10
 We 
have no directional prediction on the sign of the coefficient for financial expertise of CEOs (CEOFE) 
due to the competing theories under the negotiation hypothesis.  
                                                             
10 We also use a dummy, equal to 1 if the CEO has work experience meeting the broad definition of financial expertise. 
The untabulated results are similar.  
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We also control for corporate governance (board size and percent of outside directors) and two 
IPO firm financial characteristics (leverage and loss) in the model. Because the audit committee is a 
subset of the board, its structure depends on the board’s composition. The size of the board determines 
the number of directors available to serve on the audit committee. If the pool of board members is 
small, the likelihood of establishing an audit committee is limited. Klein (2002) finds that audit 
committee independence increases with board size and with the independence of the board. Board size 
(BDSIZE) is the number of directors on the board. Outside directors are measured as the number of 
outside directors divided by the total number of directors. Outside directors (BDINDEP) are defined as 
those who are not employees or stakeholders in the company. We expect BDSIZE and BDINDEP are 
positively related to AC existence and financial expertise. Two financial variables are leverage and 
loss. Leverage (LEV) equals total debt divided by total assets. Loss (LOSS) equals one if income 
before extraordinary items is negative, and zero otherwise.  We make no directional predictions for 
these two variables. 
The logit model of IPO firms’ choice to establish an audit committee is specified in the Model 
(1) as follows: 
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The OLS regression model of IPO firms’ choice to establish the financial expertise of audit 
committees is specified in the Model (2) as follows: 
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IV. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the IPO sample. 87.9% of firms have audit 
committees, indicating that although regulation requires all public firms to have an audit committee 
within one year after IPO, some firms wait until after their IPOs to establish audit committees. Among 
firms that have an audit committee, 60.7% of the audit committee members satisfy the SEC’s “audit 
committee financial expert” definition. The mean of IPO firm size (total assets) is 195 million dollars 
(pre-logged) and is comparable to other IPO studies. 11.5% of firms have foreign operations. IPO 
firms are 16 years old (pre-logged) on average. The CEOs hold 48.1% of shares.  20.6% of CEOs are 
financial experts. The majority (53.9%) of the IPO firms are backed by venture capitalists. On average, 
there are 7 directors on IPO boards and 73.2% of them are outside directors. For the two financial 
characteristic control variables, the leverage is 0.382 and 49.9% of sample firms report losses.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the difference in means of the variables between firms establishing 
ACs at the time of IPO (AC=1) and firms not  doing so (AC=0). 80 out of the 659 sample firms do not 
have ACs at the time of IPO. Except for the means of CEO financial expertise, the means of all the 
other variables are statistically different between the two groups.  
-----------------Insert Table 2 Here---------------- 
Correlations 
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Table 3 presents Pearson correlations between the Model (1) dependent variable AC and the 
independent variables. The Spearman correlations are similar. AC is significantly and positively 
correlated with GRWOPP, CEOHD, CEOPOWER, VC, UWRANK, BDSIZE, and BDINDEP. AC is 
negatively correlated with LNAT, FIRMAGE, FREECF, HHI, and LEV.  Since we use a reduced 
sample to test determinants of ACFE%, variable ACFE% is not presented in the correlation table.  
ACFE% is positively associated with LNAT, FOREIGN, GROWTHOPP, VC, UWRANK, BDSIZE, 
and BDINDEP, while it is negatively associated with FIRMAGE, FREECF, HHI, and CEOPOWER.  
-----------------Insert Table 3 Here---------------- 
Regression Results 
Audit Committee Establishment 
Table 4 reports the logistic regression results for Model (1). The model explains 66.2% of the 
dependent variable variance. Results show that the establishment of an audit committee is positively 
associated with foreign operations (p-value = 0.035). This finding suggests that foreign operating firms 
require the monitoring of the audit committee. Contrary to our prediction, the association between the 
dependent variable and firm size is significantly negative (p-value = 0.006). One explanation could be 
that small firms have less transparent financial information, thus investors and venture capitalists 
demand more monitoring of their financial information by audit committees. The associations between 
the establishment of an audit committee and firm age and growth opportunities are not significant.  
For our agency cost hypothesis, results in Table 4 show that the establishment of an audit 
committee is positively associated with industry concentration and with CEO shareholdings (p-values 
= 0.065 and 0.043, respectively). The coefficient of free cash flow is not significant. The results are 
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consistent with H2a that the establishment of an audit committee is positively (negatively) associated 
with (inverse) proxies for agency cost.  
With regard to the negotiation hypothesis, the coefficient on venture capital presence is positive 
and significant, which is consistent with our expectation that venture capitalists demand higher quality 
of accounting information (Morsfield and Tan 2006). The coefficient on underwriter reputation is also 
positive and significant, suggesting that underwriters with higher reputation require more monitoring 
on financial reports. The positive associations between AC and VC as well as UWRANK do not 
support the argument that the demand for audit committees decreases with the availability of substitute 
monitoring mechanisms (Klein 2002). The coefficients on CEO power and CEO financial expertise 
are not significant.  
Results on control variables indicate that larger boards and boards with more outside directors 
are more likely to establish audit committees. The associations between audit committee and leverage 
and loss are not significant.  
In summary, we find results supporting H2a and H3a that the establishment of an audit 
committee is positively associated with agency costs and negatively associated with CEO negotiation 
power. The results on H1a are somewhat mixed.  
-----------------Insert Table 4 Here---------------- 
Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
Table 5 reports the OLS regression results for the determinants of audit committee financial 
expertise. The dependent variable is ACFE%. The sample is restricted to firms that have established 
audit committees. The model explains 12.9% of dependent variable variance. The proportion of 
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financial experts on audit committees is positively associated with firm size, growth opportunities, and 
foreign operations, which supports H1b. The coefficient on firm age is not significant. The differing 
results for firm size between Table 4 and Table 5 are interesting. Small IPO firms are more likely to 
have designated ACs, which suggests greater need for monitoring by ACs. However, large firms have 
greater proportions of FEs on ACs. Large companies have more resources and might be more 
attractive to financial experts than small companies.  
Results in Table 5 show that the associations between the percentage of financial experts on 
audit committees and three measures of agency costs are not significant.  
Consistent with H3b, the financial expertise of audit committees is negatively associated with 
CEO power and positively associated with venture capital presence and underwriter reputation. The 
coefficient on CEO financial expertise is not significant. Results on control variables indicate that 
outside directors are positively associated with financial expertise on audit committees. Board size, 
leverage, and loss have insignificant coefficients.  
In summary, we find results supporting H1b and H3b: that the financial expertise on audit 
committees is positively associated with scope of operations, and is negatively associated with CEO 
negotiation power. We find no support for H2b.  
-----------------Insert Table 5 Here---------------- 
The Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 (SOX) effect  
Finally, we expect SOX to play a role in the composition of audit committees. To improve 
financial reporting quality, it requires the SEC to adopt rules mandating audit committees to have at 
least one member who is a financial expert or to disclose reasons for not adopting this requirement. 
30 
 
We predict that financial expertise of IPO firms’ boards increases in the post-SOX period. Results are 
presented in Table 6. POSTSOX equals 1 if company’s IPO year is after 2002, 0 if company’s IPO 
year is before 2002. In Table 6, the dependent variable is AC, coded as 1 if the firm has a designated 
audit committee. The result shows that the coefficient of POSTSOX is positive but insignificant. 
Table 7, with ACFE% as the dependent variable, shows that the coefficient of POSTSOX is positive 
and marginally significant (one-side p-value=0.08). 
-----------------Insert Table 6 & 7 Here---------------- 
Broadly defined financial expertise 
While SOX suggested a narrow definition of financial expertise for audit committee members, 
the SEC and the major U.S. stock exchanges adopted a broader definition of financial expertise, which 
includes accounting expertise, or any experience in supervising employees with financial 
responsibilities, or experience overseeing the performance of companies. Prior literature has failed to 
find strong evidence that financial expertise under the broad definition positively influences audit 
committee effectiveness (Carcello and Neal 2003; Anderson et al. 2004; Lee et al. 2004 and DeFond et 
al. 2005). In additional analysis, we investigate whether the hypothesized operating and governance 
characteristics affect the choice of broadly defined financial expertise on audit committees. Therefore, 
we use the proportion of broadly defined financial experts to total AC members as dependent variable 
in model (2) in an alternative regression. Results in Table 8 show that financial expertise is negatively 
associated with firm age and CEO power, and is positively associated with foreign operations 
(marginally), underwriter ranking, board size and board independence. Other variables are not 
significant. Compared with those in Table 5, the proxies capturing operational demands (e.g. size and 
growth opportunities) largely lose significance, suggesting that complexity and scope of operations 
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require more accounting expertise rather than the broadly defined financial expertise. The presence of 
venture capitalists is not significant in Table 8, which indicates that venture capitalists prefer to 
include more accounting expertise rather than the broadly defined financial expertise in audit 
committee.  
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose and test a model of the determinants of IPO firms’ choices to establish 
audit committees and to select audit committee members with financial expertise. Our paper extends 
prior board structure research concerning the determinants of the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. In our sample, about 12 percent of companies do not have an audit committee, and among 
those that have audit committees, around 30 percent have less than one third of their AC members 
with financial expertise at the time of filing IPOs. Our results show that foreign operations, industry 
concentration, CEO shareholdings, venture capital presence, underwriter ranking, the board size, and 
the percentage of outside directors are positively associated with the likelihood that companies have 
audit committees established before IPOs. Firm size is negatively associated with designation of audit 
committees pre-IPO. Results also show that IPO firms that have larger size, foreign operations, greater 
growth opportunity, less CEO power, the presence of venture capital, higher underwriter ranking, and 
more independent board members have greater proportions of audit committee members with financial 
expertise. In summary, the audit committee formation results provide some support for the operational 
scope hypothesis and stronger support for the negotiation hypothesis. Our investigation of 
determinants of financial expertise on the audit committee provides support for the operational scope 
hypothesis and the negotiation hypothesis. These results provide new evidence on an important choice 
in the literature that seeks to understand factors related to audit committee formation.  
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Like any empirical study, this study has some limitations. Most notably, we focus only on IPO 
firms that report all the required information on the board and management in their S1 files, and also 
require they be covered by Compustat. To the extent that these disclosures are inaccurate or 
incomplete it introduces error in our measures of audit committee existence and financial expertise. 
We find little evidence that agency costs influence audit committee formation or financial expertise. 
Given the importance of agency costs in determining governance features in prior literature, we think 
these results deserve further study. We also recommend that additional study be devoted to the 
opposite effects of firm size on audit committee formation versus financial expertise.  
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APPENDIX 
 TEXAS ROADHOUSE, INC. Prospectus  DATED OCTOBER 4, 2004 “After the offering, 
our board of directors will establish standing committees in connection with the discharge of 
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its responsibilities. These committees will include an audit committee, a compensation 
committee and a nominating and governance committee.” 
 KBR, Inc. Prospectus DATED NOVEMBER 15, 2006 “Our board of directors plans to have 
an audit committee, a compensation committee, an executive committee and a special 
committee following this offering. The independent directors we plan to appoint prior to the 
closing of this offering will serve as the initial members of the audit committee and the 
compensation committee of our board of directors. Following the transition periods permitted 
under applicable New York Stock Exchange and SEC requirements for independence of audit 
committee members, we intend that all of the members of our audit committee and 
compensation committee will be independent.” 
 Vanguard Natural Resources, LLC Prospectus dated October 11, 2007 “We currently 
contemplate that the audit committee will consist of up to three directors. Immediately 
following the pricing of this offering, we will have one member of the audit committee and 
such member will be independent under the independence standards established by NYSE 
Arca and SEC rules, and will be our “audit committee financial expert,” as defined under SEC 
rules.” 
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Table 1 Sample Selection Procedure  
Sample Selection Procedure 
Number of 
Observation 
Initial Public Offering issued in US from SDC (2000-2010) 2155 
Less: 
    Financial and utility firms (SIC codes: 6000-6999 and 4900-
4949) (692) 
   Closed-end fund/trusts (15) 
   Unit Issues (13) 
   Spinoff (equity carveout)  (57) 
   Offer price (US$) less than 5 (77) 
   Non-US public marketplace (220) 
   Foreign firms (20) 
   Not covered by Compustat  (211) 
   Prospectus missing (24) 
   Board and CEO information missing in Prospectus (158) 
   Financial data missing  (9) 
Final sample  659 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev 
AC 0.879 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.327 
ACFE% 0.607 0.667 0.000 1.000 0.318 
LNAT 5.274 5.095 2.502 8.687 1.179 
FOREIGN 0.115 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.320 
GRWOPP 2.901 2.302 0.405 13.476 2.286 
FMAGE 2.316 2.197 0.000 4.796 0.967 
FREECF -0.123 -0.039 -1.457 0.286 0.267 
HHI 0.049 0.039 0.012 0.286 0.041 
CEOHD 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
CEOPOWER 1.159 1.000 0.000 3.000 1.040 
CEOFE 0.206 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.405 
VC 0.539 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
UWRANK 0.574 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.495 
BDNUM 6.863 7.000 2.000 11.000 1.847 
BDIND 0.732 0.778 0.000 1.000 0.180 
LEV 0.382 0.305 0.029 1.400 0.268 
LOSS 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
N 659     
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Variable definitions: 
AC = an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has an audit 
committee, and 0 otherwise; 
ACFE% = the proportion of financial experts on the audit committee; 
LNAT = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
FOREIGN = 
 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm had pretax foreign 
income, and 0 otherwise. 
GRWOPP = growth opportunity that equals to market value of equity plus 
book value of total debt (debt in current liability and long-term 
debt), divided by total assets; 
FMAGE = Natural logarithm of firms’ age; 
HHI = The Herfindahl index; 
CEOHD = an indicator variable that equals 1 if the percent of total shares 
held by the CEO is above the median, and 0 otherwise; 
CEOPOWER = an indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO tenure (the number of 
years that a CEO is in the current position) is above the median; 
CEO is also the chairman of the board; the CEO is the founder of 
the firm, and 0 otherwise; 
CEOFE = an indicator variable that equals 1 if CEO a financial expert, and 
0 otherwise; 
VC = an indicator variable that equals 1 if the IPO is backed by a 
venture capitalist, and 0 otherwise. 
UWRANK = Ritter’s updated Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter reputation 
measure on the quality of the lead underwriter 
BDNUM = the number of the board member(s); 
BDIND = the percentage of independent member(s) on the board; 
LEV = total liability divided by total assets; 
LOSS = an indicator variable that equals 1 if income before extraordinary 
items is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel B 
 AC=0  AC=1    
Variable Mean Std Dev   Mean Std Dev   Ttest P-
value 
AT(pre-logged) 717.900 913.900  376.900 631.000  <.0001 
FOREIGN 0.025 0.157  0.128 0.334  0.007 
GRWOPP 2.343 1.870  2.978 2.790  0.020 
FMAGE(pre-
logged) 
21.788 28.241  15.993 20.094  0.023 
FREECF -0.069 0.218  -0.130 0.273  0.054 
HHI 0.063 0.064  0.048 0.037  0.002 
CEOHD 0.288 0.456  0.508 0.500  0.000 
CEOPOWER 0.963 0.947  1.187 1.051  0.071 
CEOFE 0.250 0.436  0.200 0.401  0.304 
VC 0.150 0.359  0.592 0.492  <.0001 
UWRANK 0.275 0.449  0.615 0.487  <.0001 
BDNUM 4.675 1.777  7.166 1.643  <.0001 
BDIND 0.492 0.305  0.765 0.122  <.0001 
LEV 0.482 0.302  0.368 0.260  0.000 
LOSS 0.388 0.490  0.515 0.500  0.033 
  N=80   N=579     
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Table 3 Correlations  
 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. p-value are in parenthesis.
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Table 4 Determinants of the establishment of audit committees 
  Predicted Sign Variable Name Estimate P-value 
  Intercept -8.7686 <.0001 
H1-operation hypo.     
Size + LNAT -0.5500 0.0062 
Foreign Operations  + FOREIGN 3.5646 0.0354 
Growth Opp + GRWOPP -0.0688 0.2521 
Firm age + FMAGE 0.0103 0.1223 
H2- agency hypo.     
Free Cash Flow,  + FREECF 0.5400 0.2989 
Industry Concentration + HHI 8.2809 0.0647 
CEO Shareholding ? CEOHD 0.8180 0.0874 
H3- negotiation hypo.     
CEO Power - CEOPOWER 0.1402 0.2706 
CEO FE ? CEOFE -0.2033 0.6711 
Venture Capital Presence + VC 1.1867 0.0122 
Carter-Manaster Underwriter Rank + UWRANK 0.9124 0.0176 
Control     
Board Size + NUMBD 4.1395 <.0001 
Outside Director + BDIND 4.3309 0.0001 
Leverage ? LEV 0.0780 0.9236 
Loss ? LOSS -0.0759 0.8741 
INDUSTRYDUM  included   
     
Model P-value   0.0000   
Max-rescaled R-square  0.6620   
N   659     
Dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has an audit committee and 0 
otherwise. See Table 2 for variable definitions. t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. P-
values are one-tailed for signed expectations, and two-tailed for unsigned expectations. 
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Table 5 Determinants of financial expertise on audit committee  
  Predicted Sign Variable 
Name 
Estimate P-value 
  Intercept -.17662 0.2792 
H1-operation hypo.     
Size + LNAT 0.02779 0.0364 
Foreign Operations  + FOREIGN 0.11058 0.0009 
Growth Opp  + GRWOPP 0.00972 0.0381 
Firm Age + FMAGE -.00031 0.3413 
H2- agency hypo.     
Free Cash Flow,  + FREECF -.07447 0.1158 
Industry Concentration + HHI 0.24361 0.3166 
CEO Shareholding ? CEOHD 0.02291 0.4299 
H3- negociation hypo.     
CEO Power - CEOPOWER -.02601 0.0280 
CEO FE ? CEOFE 0.01681 0.6218 
Venture Capital Presence + VC 0.12716 0.0001 
Carter-Manaster Underwriter Rank + UWRANK 0.1024 0.0002 
Control     
Board Size + BDNUM 0.03742 0.2671 
Outside Director + BDIND 0.22986 0.0186 
Leverage ? LEV 0.08638 0.1987 
Loss ? LOSS -.02236 0.5166 
INDUSTRYDUM  included   
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Model P-value   0.0000   
Adj R-Sq  0.1286   
N   576     
Dependent variable is ACFE%. See Table 2 for other variable definitions. 
t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. P-values are one-tailed for signed expectations, 
and two-tailed for unsigned expectations. 
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Table 6 Additional Test for SOX: Determinants of the establishment of audit committee  
  Predicted 
Sign 
Variable Name Estimate P-value 
  Intercept -3.6221 0.0084 
H1-operation hypo.   
  Size + LNAT -0.1254 0.4553 
Foreign Operations + FOREIGN 1.6475 0.1240 
Growth Opp + GRWOPP -0.0076 0.9428 
Firm Age + FMAGE 0.0077 0.3234 
H2- agency hypo.   
  Free Cash Flow,  + FREECF -0.0687 0.9517 
Industry Concentration + HHI -2.0625 0.6563 
CEO Shareholding + CEOHD 0.7148 0.1352 
H3- negociation hypo.   
  CEO Power - CEOPOWER 0.1776 0.4343 
CEO FE ? CEOFE -0.3515 0.4201 
Venture Capital Presence + VC 1.2435 0.0178 
Carter-Manaster Underwriter 
Rank 
+ UWRANK 1.1006 0.0062 
Control     
Board Size + BDNUM 0.5363 <.0001 
Outside Director + BDIND 4.4108 <.0001 
Leverage ? LEV 0.3424 0.6855 
Loss ? LOSS -0.2464 0.5970 
PostSOX + POSTSOX 0.4426 0.3104 
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INDUSTRYDUM  included  
     
Model P-value   0.0000   
Adj R-Sq  0.2050   
N   659     
Dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has an audit committee and 0 
otherwise. POSTSOX=1 if an IPO incurs in the year after 2002; 0 otherwise. See Table 2 for 
other variable definitions.t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. p-values are two-tailed. 
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Table 7 Additional Test for SOX: Determinants of financial expertise on audit committee  
  Predicted 
Sign 
Variable Name Estimate P-value 
  Intercept 0.7823 0.0410 
H1-operation hypo.   
  Size + LNAT 0.0081 0.7496 
Foreign Operations + FOREIGN 0.0995 0.0721 
Growth Opp + GRWOPP 0.0204 0.0491 
Firm Age + FMAGE -0.0029 0.9174 
H2- agency hypo.   
  Free Cash Flow,  + FREECF -0.0135 0.5806 
Industry Concentration + HHI -0.5790 0.4554 
CEO Shareholding + CEOHD -0.1475 0.0062 
H3- negociation hypo.   
  CEO Power - CEOPOWER 0.0302 0.1949 
CEO FE ? CEOFE -0.0503 0.3310 
Venture Capital Presence + VC 0.1270 0.0100 
Carter-Manaster Underwriter 
Rank 
+ UWRANK 0.0678 0.1116 
Control     
Board Size + NUMBD -0.0481 0.6113 
Outside Director + BDIND 0.2937 0.1133 
Leverage ? LEV 0.1564 0.1218 
Loss ? LOSS 0.1687 0.1368 
PostSOX + POSTSOX 0.0757 0.1643 
49 
 
INDUSTRYDUM  included   
     
Model P-value   0.0000   
Adj R-Sq  0.2050   
N   576     
Dependent variable is ACFE%. POSTSOX=1 if an IPO incurs in the year after 2002; 0 otherwise. 
See Table 2 for other variable definitions. 
t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. p-values are two-tailed. 
  
50 
 
Table 8 Additional Test for the broadly defined financial expertise: Determinants of 
financial expertise on audit committee 
  Predicted 
Sign 
Variable 
Name 
Estimate P-value 
  Intercept 0.7733 <.0001 
H1-operation hypo.    
 Size + LNAT -0.0050 0.6823 
Foreign Operations + FOREIGN 0.0388 0.1988 
Growth Opp + GRWOPP 0.0051 0.2499 
Firm Age + FMAGE -0.0010 0.1091 
H2- agency hypo.    
 Free Cash Flow,  + FREECF -0.0404 0.3846 
Industry Concentration + HHI -0.1880 0.6571 
CEO Shareholding + CEOHD -0.0048 0.8330 
H3- negociation hypo.    
 CEO Power - CEOPOWER -0.0236 0.0256 
CEO FE ? CEOFE -0.0265 0.2841 
Venture Capital Presence + VC 0.0193 0.4441 
Carter-Manaster Underwriter Rank + UWRANK 0.0418 0.0362 
Control     
Board Size + NUMBD 0.0100 0.1202 
Outside Director + BDIND 0.1741 0.0412 
Leverage ? LEV 0.0209 0.6733 
Loss ? LOSS 0.0004 0.9867 
INDUSTRYDUM  included   
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Model P-value   0.0000   
Adj R-Sq  0.1558   
N   576     
Dependent variable is ACFE% (the broad definition) where financial expertise is coded as 1 if a 
AC member has experience of either one of category (1)-(4). See Table 2 for other variable 
definitions. 
t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. p-values are two-tailed. 
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Choice of Industry Expert Auditors by IPO Firms 
Abstract: Industry specialist auditors are of great importance for firms at their initial public 
offerings because they monitor financial reporting. Research has investigated the effects of high-
quality financial reporting on firms’ performance at IPOs and in the post-IPO periods. In this 
paper, I propose and test a model of factors impacting IPO firms’ choice of an industry expert 
audit. My results show that the presence of venture capital and proprietary costs are the most 
important factors, and that both factors decrease the likelihood of employing an industry expert 
auditor.  
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Choice of Industry Expert Auditors by IPO Firms 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates determinants of companies’ choice of industry expert auditors prior 
to initial public offerings (IPOs). Auditor choice at IPOs is important because substantial 
information asymmetry exists between insiders and potential investors in IPO firms. High-
quality audited financial statements are a primary means of reducing the information asymmetry. 
Industry expertise is a well-established determinant of audit quality, but no prior study has 
investigated the association of industry specialist auditors with companies issuing IPOs. Several 
likely determinants of auditor choice arguably are unique to the IPO setting (for example, 
whether a firm is backed by venture capital; whether the firm has a designated audit committee). 
For these and other reasons, I study IPO firms’ choice to be audited by industry expert auditors. 
Information asymmetry characterizes IPOs for several reasons. First, there is almost no news 
media coverage of firms before the IPO (Rao 1989). Second, private firms’ financial reports 
usually are not filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and thus are 
unavailable to the public until the IPO. This contributes to a relatively poor information 
environment including lack of coverage of pre-IPO firms by financial analysts. The information 
asymmetry potentially enables managers of IPO firms to inflate earnings in the pre-IPO period 
(Teoh et al. 1998a; Teoh et al. 1998b). Entrepreneurs are under pressure to report high earnings 
to attract potential underwriters and investors. In the post-IPO period, insiders often wish to sell 
their personal holdings in the secondary market at the end of the lockup period.
11
 To keep the 
aftermarket price from dropping below the offer price, and to maintain their reputation for 
reliability, managers of IPO firms have incentives to continue managing earnings upward (Brau 
                                                             
11 Entrepreneurs are not allowed to sell their original holdings during a lockup period commonly lasting 180 days 
or longer immediately after the IPO.  
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and Johnson 2009). A shortfall in post-IPO earnings can disappoint investors and lead to 
lawsuits.
12
 In summary, information asymmetry exists in the pre-IPO setting, coupled with 
incentives for managers to manipulate earnings and otherwise dress up financial reports. 
High-quality audits are important for IPO firms to improve financial reporting quality and 
further reduce information asymmetry. Willenborg (1999, 225) states that “because [pre-IPO] 
asymmetries create a demand for information to help establish equity values and for market 
signaling to mitigate adverse selection, IPOs offer a natural setting for studying the importance 
of auditing”. One key consideration for entrepreneurs planning to issue an IPO is which 
accounting firm to hire. Beatty (1989) shows that hiring nationally known auditors helps to 
reduce the effect of underpricing associated with IPOs. Menon and Williams (1991) find that 
investment bankers and their clients have a preference for Big 8 auditors. Hogan (1997) provides 
evidence that IPO firms consider the trade-off between the benefit (less underpricing) and the 
cost (higher audit fees) when selecting Big 6 auditors. Copley and Douthett (2002) and Mayhew 
et al. (2004) demonstrate that the demand for high-quality auditors (Big N auditors) increases 
with IPO firm risk and that auditor choice is a substitute for ownership retention as a signal of 
firm risk for an IPO. These prior studies suggest that auditor choice is a critical issue at IPOs. 
However, most of the studies focus on the choice between Big N versus other auditors. Evidence 
indicates that industry specialist auditors are associated with higher audit quality in non-IPO 
settings (Gul et al. 2009; Krishnan 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010). This study extends prior 
literature by investigating choice of industry specialist auditors in the IPO setting. 
To conduct my examination, I use a sample of 488 IPO firms that hire ‘Big 7’ audit firms 
(defined as the Big 5 at that time plus the two largest non-Big 5 audit firms) and that are in non-
                                                             
12 DuCharme et al. (2004) find evidence that sued IPO firms have more pronounced reversal in abnormal accrual 
earnings and lower stock returns than IPO firms not sued.  
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financial and non-utility industries during the period from 2000 to 2009. First, both logit and 
ordered logit models show that the presence of venture capitalists and proprietary costs are 
negatively associated with the likelihood that an IPO company will employ an industry expert 
auditor. I argue that the monitoring and industry expertise provided by venture capitalists serve 
as substitutes for industry expert auditors. Proprietary costs are particularly salient when IPO 
companies first begin to disclose financial information publicly, including to competitors who 
are more powerful and mature. My results are consistent with prior evidence that mature clients 
often prefer not to be audited by the same auditors who also serve their direct competitors. 
Second, IPO firm age is negatively associated with choice of industry expert auditors. I interpret 
this as evidence that information asymmetry between IPO companies and potential investors is 
reduced when IPO firms have extensive ‘track records’. Third, results also show firms that have 
foreign operations are more likely to employ an industry expert auditor.  
My paper contributes to research on audit firm selection. Early studies addressing questions 
related to auditor choice generally focus on auditor change among mature public companies (e.g. 
Francis and Wilson 1988; Johnson and Lys 1990; DeFond 1992). Later studies examine why 
companies choose large auditors or industry specialist auditors (e.g., Willenborg 1999; Abbott 
and Parker 2000). While this prior literature generally finds that audit firms differentiate 
themselves from competitors via brand name or industry specialization, I provide new evidence 
that in the IPO setting, firms select industry expert audit firms based on factors which are 
different from those affecting auditor choices by more mature public companies. My study also 
extends the literature on auditor choice in the IPO setting (Willenborg 1999; Hogan 1997; Beatty 
1993) by focusing on choice of industry expert auditors. I know of no published research that has 
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been conducted on IPO firms’ choice of industry expert auditors. My paper contributes to the 
literature by considering a broad range of factors which may affect this choice.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I provide brief reviews of the 
literatures, and then turn to a discussion on how they impact auditor choice and audit fees in the 
IPO setting. This discussion provides the academic theory underlying the development of my 
conceptual model of IPO firms’ choice to employ an industry expertise auditor, along with my 
formal hypothesis regarding the audit fees. I describe the research design in Section III and 
present the results in Section IV. Section V provides discussion on the results and concludes the 
paper.  
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Audit Industry Specialization  
Audit industry specialization is one of the main factors impacting audit quality due to 
auditors’ enormous investment in the knowledge and technology in specific industries of their 
clients. Prior literature finds that auditors’ industry expertise provides an incremental 
contribution to audit quality beyond auditors’ brand name (Big N versus non-Big N). Importantly 
for IPO firms, research indicates that earnings quality, as measured by earnings response 
coefficients and discretionary accruals, is higher for client firms audited by industry specialists 
than non-specialists (Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003; Chin and Chi 2009; and Reichelt and 
Wang 2010). Financial analysts rank clients of industry-specialist audit firms higher, in terms of 
disclosure quality, than clients of non-specialists (Dunn & Mayhew 2004). These findings 
suggest that an auditor’s industry specialization has value to clients, and that capital markets 
view audits provided by industry specialists as having higher quality. Hence, the largest audit 
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firms use industry specialization as a differentiation strategy (Mayhew & Wilkins 2003). Elder 
(1999) finds that IPO underpricing is lower for companies that use industry specialist auditors, 
which suggests that industry specialist auditors mitigate information asymmetry for investors by 
increasing their financial reporting quality. Therefore, managers of some IPO firms may have 
strong incentives to employ industry specialist auditors. Although auditor industry expertise is an 
important factor which contributes to high audit quality, prior studies of IPO auditor choice focus 
on choice of brand name (Big N) auditors. This study remedies the omission by examining the 
choice of industry expert auditors by IPO firms. 
Following prior studies which examine industry expertise as the variable of interest (Balsam 
et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003; Dunn and Mayhew 2004), I use an auditor portfolio definition for 
national and city industry expertise. Alternatively I define national and city industry expertise as 
the auditor having the largest market share in a given industry (Neal and Riley 2004; Behn et al. 
2008).  Results are similar using both types of measures. 
Venture Capitalists 
Venture capitalists reduce information asymmetry at IPOs through their value-added 
expertise and services. Prior research suggests that venture capitalists (VCs) are actively 
involved in the management of firms they finance and often take membership on the board of 
directors along with others holding concentrated equity positions. Thereby, they retain 
significant ownership and economic rights (Sahlman, 1994; Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and 
Weiss 1991). Gladstone (1989) suggests that some VCs maintain consulting staffs that 
participate in the management of portfolio companies. Sahlman (1990) argues that VC contracts 
are designed to provide staged financing at different points, which allows the VCs to terminate 
their involvement and cut their losses if the expected net present value of the project falls below 
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expectations. It also prevents the management from investing in non-value-maximizing activities 
and reduces the free cash flow problem. Further, VCs design compensation schemes which are 
directly linked to value creation and retain the option of replacing the entrepreneurs as managers 
unless certain key objectives are met. Such a stringent contractual relationship between VCs and 
entrepreneurs reduces agency costs by preventing managers from indulging in non-value-
maximizing activities.  
Consistent with VCs’ monitoring role, prior studies document that VCs are associated with 
lower underpricing and higher earnings quality at IPOs (Barry et al. 1990; Morsfield and Tan 
2006). Moreover, VCs usually specialize in particular industries and use their knowledge and 
contacts to help the company recruit key employees, develop supplier and customer relations, 
and assist in production and operations (Warne 1988).  By focusing on a relatively narrow set of 
industries, VCs are able to provide the firms they back with greater industry expertise and more 
efficient monitoring. I predict that the presence of VCs reduces the demand for industry expert 
external auditors at IPOs. The first auditor choice hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H1: IPO firms backed by VCs are less likely to hire auditors with industry specialization. 
I code a dichotomous VC variable as one for IPO firms backed by VCs, and as zero 
otherwise.  
Underwriter Reputation 
Underwriters are another import player in an IPO setting. Underwriters (investment banks) 
provide a number of interrelated marketing, pricing, and distribution services for IPO issuers 
including approaching potential investors with offers to sell shares. These activities occur prior 
to the offer date (in the “premarket” period) and after the offer date (in the “aftermarket” period). 
An underwriter provides assurance to potential investors. Underwriters' knowledge about similar 
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securities and about likely views of potential investors helps to determine a price for the offering. 
Underwriters also assist in establishing and stabilizing the aftermarket (particularly in a firm 
commitment offering). Therefore, underwriters play a vital role in IPOs of companies that lack 
track records of financial information.  
Underwriters provide different services than auditors. An auditor's attestation to financial 
statements included in the Prospectus assists investors and underwriters in estimating future cash 
flows. The value of the auditor’s services is contingent on the extent to which an underwriter 
could substitute for auditors to reduce uncertainty (Hogan 1997). Therefore, the reputation of the 
investment bank may influence investors’ opinions about the quality of an issuer and its long-
term prospects as much as, or more than, the issuer’s association with an industry expert auditor. 
In this view, better underwriter reputation reduces the demand for high audit quality as a means 
of reducing information asymmetry. 
However, high prestige underwriters may require IPO firms to use high quality auditors. 
Underwriters suffer a decrease in their market value significantly in excess of estimated direct 
costs when overpricing IPOs (Nanda and Yun 1997). In addition to such reputation effects, 
mispriced offerings are expected to impose additional direct costs on managing underwriters due 
to price stabilization and potential legal liability (Lowry and Shu 2002; Hughes and Thakor 
1992). Mispriced offerings can result from reliance on faulty financial information provided by 
IPO firms. Thus, underwriters having greater reputation to protect are likely to require higher 
quality auditors as a means of reducing information asymmetry and litigation risk. Given the 
conflicting scenarios outlined above, I state my second auditor choice hypothesis in null form: 
H2: IPO firms’ underwriter reputations are not related to the choice of auditors with industry 
specialization. 
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 I use Jay Ritter’s updated Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter reputation rating to measure 
the quality of the lead underwriter.  
Proprietary Costs 
Another factor influencing firms’ selection of auditors is proprietary costs. A potential 
proprietary cost is defined as any possible reduction in future cash flows attributable to a 
disclosure. Verrecchia (1983) states that accounting information about a firm can be useful to 
competitors, shareholders, or employees in a way which is harmful to a firm's prospects. This 
can be true even if (or perhaps especially if) the information is favorable. The larger the 
proprietary costs, the greater is the decrease in the firm’s value upon disclosure, and the greater 
is the incentive not to disclose (Scott 1994). Bamber and Cheon (1998) provide evidence 
supporting this view; they demonstrate that companies with high proprietary information costs 
(i.e., those with few competitors) disclose less precise management earnings forecasts. Botosan 
and Stanford (2005) and Wang et al. (2011) find that firms withhold segment information when 
proprietary costs are high.
13
 In summary, the accounting literature documents that proprietary 
costs are an important factor in managers’ consideration of information disclosure.  
Proprietary costs should be especially important in the IPO setting. In pre-IPO periods, non-
listed firms enjoy a competitive advantage by not being required to disclose accounting 
information to their competitors, while benefitting from information that their publicly listed 
competitors must disclose. Subsequent to IPOs, companies have to meet the same information 
disclosure requirements as their public competitors. In addition, most IPO firms are smaller and 
less powerful than their publicly listed competitors. Thus they arguably are highly vulnerable to 
                                                             
13 Managers have explicitly stated that proprietary costs are important factors in their willingness to reveal 
information. For instance, in comment letters written to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), prior to 
issuance of SFAS No. 131, managers of actual and prospective multi-segment firms expressed concerns that 
increased disclosure of segment information would prove useful to their competitors. 
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proprietary costs. It is important to note that the proprietary costs of information disclosure vary 
with firm and industry characteristics. Companies operating in highly competitive industries, in 
which many relatively small producers provide fairly standard “commoditized” products, are not 
subject to proprietary costs. Proprietary costs are prevalent in concentrated industries where a 
small number of powerful companies compete to offer products that they attempt to differentiate 
as higher quality, thus justifying higher prices. 
Proprietary cost considerations could reduce demand for industry specialist auditors at IPOs. 
If clients consider their auditors to be a potential source of proprietary information transfer, then 
clients in concentrated industries may avoid having industry specialist auditors who are more 
likely to audit their competitors also. Kwon (1996) argues that clients desiring audit firms not 
associated with competitors are likely to select audit firms not engaged in the client's or potential 
client's industry. His findings suggest that clients from highly concentrated industries are less 
likely to hire industry expert auditors. In addition to clients’ concerns about possible information 
transfer via audit firm personnel, clients also may perceive that industry specialist auditors 
require clients to disclose more information and more transparent information.
14
 Although 
companies cannot avoid the increased proprietary costs arising at IPOs, they may seek to 
minimize such costs through their choice of auditors. I predict that greater proprietary costs 
decrease the demand for industry specialist auditors. My third hypothesis is: 
H3: IPO firms’ proprietary costs are negatively related to the choice of auditors with 
industry specialization.  
I use three measures to proxy for proprietary costs: the Herfindahl industry concentration 
index; the four-firm industry concentration ratio; and an inverse proxy for proprietary costs, 
                                                             
14 Dunn and Mayhew (2004)  find that clients of industry-specialist audit firms are ranked higher in terms of 
disclosure quality by financial analysts.  
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capital intensity, measuring the barrier to entry (DeFond and Hung, 2003; Hou and Robinson, 
2006).  
CEO Power 
Powerful CEOs usually influence the corporate governance structure by putting more 
insiders on the board and/or reducing the efficiency of audit committees (for example, Boone et 
al. 2007 and Carcello et al. 2011). CEO power refers to the potential for the CEO to leverage 
ownership or position to pursue her or his own goals. According to agency theory, CEOs are 
self-interested, risk averse, and possess goals that diverge from those of shareholders; the 
position of CEO confers considerable power over a firm’s resources because shareholders are 
widely dispersed and no one shareholder can exert direct control. Thus, CEOs will engage in 
self-serving actions at shareholders’ expense when given an opportunity  (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). In addition to the power granted by their position, many CEOs possess power through 
circumstances such as long tenure and chairing the board of directors (Daily and Johnson 1997).  
There can be some positive benefits to firms of having powerful CEOs, such as clear lines of 
authority, faster strategic response times, and a focal point for external accountability (Cannella 
Jr and Monroe 1997; Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994).  However, a large body of literature 
documents adverse CEO entrenchment effects consistent with agency theory. For instance, a 
CEO whose power remains unchecked by outside directors is more likely to take self-serving 
actions that decrease shareholder wealth (Dunn 2004; Frankforter et al. 2000). Effective board 
monitoring can help prevent abuses of power and also ensure that CEO power is used to benefit 
the firm (Finkelstein and D’Aveni 1994). Powerful CEOs who have influence on the selection of 
audit committee members can reduce the monitoring role of an audit committee on their firms’ 
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financial reports (Carcello et al. 2011). In addition, CEOs are more likely to have incentives than 
CFOs to get involved in material accounting manipulations (Feng et al. 2011).  
As discussed above, managers of IPO firms have strong incentives to inflate their companies’ 
earnings and are less exposed to external monitoring. Hence, if the CEO has strong bargaining 
power when negotiating with pre-IPO shareholders, regarding the choice of auditor at IPO, I 
expect that powerful CEOs are less likely to hire industry expert auditors. The hypothesis is 
stated as follows. 
H4: IPO firms having more powerful CEOs are less likely to choose auditors with industry 
specialization. 
I use four CEO characteristics to proxy for CEO power: whether a CEO is chair of the board; 
whether a CEO is the founder of an IPO firm; how long a CEO has held that position with an 
IPO firm; and the percentage of outstanding common shares a CEO holds prior to an IPO.  
Audit Committee Designation and Financial Expertise of Audit Committee Members 
A well-functioning Audit Committee (hereafter AC) safeguards the independence of the 
auditor and imposes discipline on the financial reporting process. Despite its important role in 
the assurance of corporate financial reporting, little is known about the AC’s role in the choice of 
auditors at IPOs. This paper examines the effect of AC characteristics (AC existence and AC 
finance expertise) on external auditor choice.  
One unique characteristic of IPO corporate governance is that some IPO companies do not 
have designated ACs during the IPO process. Companies completing an IPO have a one-year 
phase-in period in which to comply with major stock exchange requirements governing audit 
committees.
15
 Venkataraman et al. (2008) report that 78.6 percent of 350 IPO firms during 2000-
                                                             
15 According to stock exchange rules (NYSE 303A.07 Audit Committee Additional Requirements; Nasdaq Listing 
Rule 5600 Series), there must be one independent member on the audit committee at the time of initial listing, a 
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2002 make reference to specific individuals as being current members of an audit committee in 
the prospectuses while the remaining 22.4 percent do not. Given the important monitoring role of 
ACs, I predict that IPO firms with designated ACs are more likely to choose industry specialist 
auditors than those without.  
The financial expertise of audit committee members has been subjected to considerable 
attention following a wave of high-profile corporate scandals. Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 to enhance financial reporting quality. This includes specific board guidelines 
promoting greater financial expertise among audit committee members. Section 407 of SOX 
requires that public firms’ audit committees must include at least one member who is a financial 
expert or, otherwise, must disclose reasons for not doing so. The NYSE and NASD adopted this 
recommendation. The exchanges’ rules provide that this requirement can be satisfied either by a 
member having knowledge of GAAP obtained from experience as an accountant or auditor, or 
by someone having experience in supervising or assessing the performance of accountants or 
auditors, such as CFOs or CEOs.
16
 
The initial definition of financial expertise in Section 407 of SOX only referred to education 
and experience in accounting and auditing. Some observers argued that provision narrows the 
pool of candidates qualified to serve as financial experts. In response, the SEC adopted a broader 
definition of financial expert for its final rules, similar to the provisions of the exchange rules.  In 
addition to experience in accounting and auditing, the SEC’s definition of financial expert now 
allows for experience in finance (such as being CFO), as well as experience in supervising 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
majority of independent audit committee members within 90 days thereafter, and a fully-independent audit 
committee within one year. The SEC specifies that if no AC is designated, the full board functions as the audit 
committee. Therefore, some IPO firms choose not to establish designated ACs until the completion of initial listing. 
16 The NYSE (2012, section 303A.07.a) now requires that each member of the AC be (or become) financially 
literate. The financial literacy qualification is interpreted by the listed company’s board of directors. The standard of 
financial literacy clearly is less stringent that the standard for financial expertise. 
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employees with financial responsibilities and overseeing the performance of companies (such as 
being CEO).  
Audit committees having greater financial expertise may be in favor of hiring industry 
specialist auditors to enhance financial reporting quality at IPOs. Reputation costs are arguably 
higher for AC members with financial expertise than for those without. Therefore, the assurance 
provided by industry specialist auditors safeguards their reputation better than non-industry-
specialists. Financial experts know more about auditing procedures and arguably have more 
appreciation for external auditors’ industry expertise. The literature documents that ACs having 
members with narrowly defined financial expertise (i.e. accounting or auditing education and 
experience) improve financial reporting quality. For example, a number of studies demonstrate 
that firms with narrowly defined financial expertise on the audit committee are less likely to 
restate earnings (Abbot et al. 2004), and less likely to manage earnings (Xie et al. 2003; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2006). However, research provides mixed evidence on the effectiveness of 
broadly defined financial expertise in promoting improved financial reporting (Carcello and Neal 
2003; Defond et al. 2005; Park and Shin 2004; Goh 2009). Goh (2009) finds that ACs with 
greater nonaccounting financial expertise remediate internal control material weakness more 
rapidly, while several other studies fail to provide strong evidence that financial expertise under 
the broad definition positively influences AC effectiveness  (Anderson et al. 2004; Carcello and 
Neal 2003; Lee et al. 2004; Defond et al. 2005). Therefore, I expect IPO firms with narrowly 
defined financial expert AC members are more likely to hire industry expert auditors. The 
hypotheses are stated as follow.  
H5a: AC existence prior to IPOs is positively related to the choice of auditors with industry 
specialization.  
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H5b: AC members having narrowly defined financial expertise are positively related to the 
choice of auditors with industry specialization. 
The existence of a designated AC is captured by a dichotomous variable coded as one if the 
prospectus reports any board member serves on the AC. Otherwise it is coded as zero. A 
dichotomous measure of AC financial expertise is set to equal to one if at least one audit 
committee member has narrowly defined financial expertise, and as zero otherwise. 
Management Financial Expertise 
Management financial expertise is another factor that can influence the decision of auditor 
selection by IPO firms. It directly impacts firms’ financial accounting choices and reporting 
quality. Recent studies document that management fixed effects explain a significant portion of 
the cross-sectional variation in corporate outcomes such as investments (Bertrand and Schoar 
2003), financial disclosure (Bamber et al. 2010), financial reporting (Ge et al. 2011), and tax 
planning (Dyreng et al. 2010). Their results conclude that individual executives have distinct 
qualities which influence their organizations’ behavior and performance. Among these personal 
attributes, financial expertise arguably has an important impact on firms’ outcomes and 
performance.  
Several studies report a positive relation between management financial expertise and 
reporting quality. Aier et al. (2005) find that companies having CFOs who are CPAs are 
significantly less likely to have accounting restatements. Li et al. (2010) find that companies 
whose CFOs are CPAs or who have public accounting firm working experience are associated 
with lower likelihood of receiving adverse SOX 404 opinions. In an IPO setting, Chemmanur 
and Paeglis (2005) document that better management quality signals intrinsic value and private 
information to the market, therefore reducing information asymmetry costs borne by IPO firms. I 
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speculate that better management financial expertise can reduce information asymmetry by 
signaling lower firm risk and higher reporting quality for IPO firms. In this scenario, managerial 
financial expertise reduces the need for industry expert auditors. 
Other studies suggest that managerial financial expertise may be associated with poor 
financial reporting and higher firm risk. Feng et al. (2011) find that CFOs of firms engaging in 
irregularities are more likely to be CPAs than those of control firms. They suggest that compliant 
CFOs who are CPAs are better able to come up with accounting schemes to boost earnings.
17
 Ge 
et al. (2011) document that CFOs who are CPAs are more aggressive in their financial reporting 
practices, i.e. engage in more off-balance-sheet activities and smoothing of earnings. In this 
scenario, managers who are financial experts increase information asymmetry with potential 
investors and increase the need for industry specialist auditors.  
As discussed above, managerial financial expertise could either increase or decrease 
investors’ perceived need for greater external audit quality.  In either case independent members 
of the board, especially those representing existing providers of equity capital, can make their 
preferences known regarding auditor choice. Given the contrasting scenarios, I state the 
hypothesis in null form. 
H6: Managerial financial expertise is not related to IPO firms’ choice of auditors with 
industry specialization. 
 For a CEO, a dichotomous measure for financial expertise is set to equal to one if she or he 
is a CPA, has prior work experience in public accounting, has work experience as a chief 
financial officer, vice-president of finance or controller or has work experience as an investment 
                                                             
17 More broadly, Ge et al.  (2011) study whether individual CFO characteristics, including CPA status, affect 
companies’ financial reporting choices. They report (2010, 5) only “limited evidence of the impact of these 
observable CFO characteristics on CFOs’ reporting choices, suggesting that these common and observable 
characteristics capture only a small portion of CFO styles” (Ge et al. (2011,1176)). Their results do not imply that 
CFO characteristics such as CPA status are irrelevant in specific situations, such as irregularities. 
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banker, financial analyst, venture capitalist, or any other financial management roles. It is coded 
as zero otherwise. For a CFO, a dichotomous measure for financial expertise is set to equal to 
one if she or he is a CPA, or has prior work experience in public accounting. 
Company Characteristics 
I control for a variety of company characteristics. One is financial leverage. As in 
Reynolds and Francis (2000), prior research has documented that managers of firms with high 
levels of debt have an incentive to manipulate earnings upwards. I expect that the higher a 
company’s leverage is, the more important the credibility of the information communicated via 
the company’s financial statmenents. As the demand for enhanced information credibility 
increases, I expect companies to be more likely to employ an industry expert auditor. I  control 
for various other company characteristics including total assets, IPO gross proceeds, and firm 
age. Additional company characteristics include foreign operations, reporting a loss, and the 
extent of inventory and receivables. In general I expect that larger and more complex IPO firms 
are more likely to choose industry specialist auditors. However, given lack of prior research 
using industry specialist auditors as a dependent variable for IPO firms, I make no directional 
predictions regarding the association of these variables with companies’ choice to employ an 
industry specialist auditor. 
 
III. SAMPLE, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AND METHOD 
Sample Selection 
To determine whether the factors discussed above  impact IPO firms’ auditor choice, I 
require identification of IPO firms, their venture capitalists, underwriters, board members, 
management members, and their auditors in the year of their IPOs.  I obtain the sample of IPO 
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firms from the Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation (SDC)/Platinum New Issue 
database. I hand-collect corporate governance data, as well as CEO’s and CFOs’ background and 
experience data, from the prospectuses (S-1 files) filed by firms going public.
18
 In particular, 
personal information about CEOs, CFOs and board members is obtained from the management 
section of the IPO prospectus. I obtain the identity of IPO firms’ auditors from Audit Analytics. 
The financial information for IPO firms is from Compustat. 
Table 1 shows the sample selection process. I start with all initial public offerings of 
common equity during the period January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2009.  Similar to several 
prior IPO studies (Chemmanur and Paeglis 2005; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003),
19
 I exclude REITs, 
closed-end funds, unit offerings, financial and utility firms (all firms with SIC codes: 6000-6999 
and 4900-4949), leveraged buyouts (LBO), roll-ups, IPOs having offer prices less than five 
dollars, and foreign companies.
 
I retain a list of 1,049 IPOs. I then delete 206 not covered by 
Compustat and Audit Analytics, and 58 firms that do not use the largest seven auditors. The 
largest seven auditors consist of the current Big 4, plus Arthur Andersen (prior to dissolution), 
Grant Thornton, and BDO Seidman.
20
  For convenience I will refer to these as the Big 7. I also 
require observations for which management and board members’ financial expertise information 
are not missing in the year of IPOs which further reduces the sample by 161. Finally, I eliminate 
136 observations with missing financial and/or auditor data, yielding a maximum final sample of 
488 IPO firms. 
(Insert Table 1 about Here) 
                                                             
18 The prospectuses (S-1 files) are obtained from the SEC’s Edgar database. In the United States, all the firms 
seeking IPOs file Form S-1 to register securities with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  The S-
1 contains the basic business and financial information on an issuer with respect to a specific securities offering and 
disclose management and corporate governance information as well. 
19 I follow the selection process used by Chemmanur and Paeglis  (2005) because they also investigate  the role of 
management quality in the IPO setting.  
20 I limit my sample to IPO firms audited by the largest auditors to control for unobservable auditor-specific factors 
that affect audit pricing and audit industry expertise, similar to a prior study by Mayhew and Wilkins (2003).  
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows the year-by-year sample distribution of the number of IPOs. The years 2000, 
2007 and 2004 have the highest numbers of IPOs, with 117 (24%), 73 (15 %) and 70 (14%) 
respectively. Table 3 shows that services and manufacturing industries comprise approximately 
81% of the total IPO offerings in the sample. Industry classification is based on Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) two-digit codes. Panel B also summarizes the distribution of the 
IPO firms by auditor.  The results show that of the 488 IPO firms, 35 percent hire Ernst & Young, 
24% percent hire PwC, 17 percent hire Deloitte & Touche, and 13 percent hire KPMG. The 
remainder of the sample companies hire Arthur Andersen (prior to dissolution), Grant Thornton, 
and BDO Seidman. 
(Insert Tables 2 and 3 about Here) 
Research Methods 
Explaining Choice of an Industry Specialist Auditor by an IPO firm 
To examine the determinants of IPO firms’ choice to hire an industry specialist auditor, I 
use both a logit model and an ordered logit model. For the logit model, the dependent variable is 
AUDindepx1, coded as one if a given IPO firm hires an industry expert auditor (defined at the 
national level, city-level or both the national and city-level), and as zero otherwise. For the 
ordered logit model, the dependent variable is AUDindepx2, which equals 3 if a given IPO firm 
hires an auditor that is both the national and city-level industry expert, equals 2 if an only the 
city-level industry expert, equals 1 if only the national industry expert, and equals 0 if the auditor 
is not the industry expert on any of these dimensions. Independent variables represent factors 
that I propose will affect IPO firms’ choice to employ an industry specialist auditor, including 
characteristics of IPO firms, offerings, and corporate governance.  
71 
 
Audit Industry Expertise  
Audit fees by client industry are a common measure of industry expertise, and the 
identification of the Big 7 expert in each industry is based on each Big 7 firm’s share of industry 
audit fees for each two digit SIC in the sample (Hogan and Jeter 1999; Ferguson et al. 2003).
21
 
Following prior studies which examine industry expertise as the variable of interest (Balsam et al. 
2003; Krishnan 2003; Dunn and Mayhew 2004), I use the portfolio definition for national and 
city industry expertise to capture different aspects of this construct.22  
I define a national (city) industry specialist in a particular year (and in a particular city) as 
the auditor having the highest percentage of its fees in a given industry (Neal and Riley 2004; 
Behn et al. 2008). This measure captures investment in significant knowledge bases in particular 
industries by the smaller auditors (Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman), and computes an industry 
specialization measure based on each auditor's portfolio of clients.
23
  I compute the portfolio 
industry expertise of an auditor by summing the auditor's fees from its clients in a two-digit SIC 
industry and dividing by the sum of total audit fees of all clients of the auditor. I perform this 
analysis at both the national level and the city level. Each two-digit SIC industry has one 
industry expert auditor at the national level and at the city level.  
 
 
                                                             
21 The Big 4 National market shares, averaged across all 45 industries and the four years in the sample, are as 
follows: the top-ranked Big 4 firm per industry has an average market share of 41 per cent of audit fees, while the 
second-ranked firm has a market share of only 25 per cent. The third-ranked firm has an average market share of 17 
per cent, the fourth-ranked firm a market share of 11 per cent. The Big 4 City market shares, averaged across all 45 
industries, 68 cities and four years in the sample, are as follows: the top-ranked Big 4 firm has an average city-level 
industry market share of 68 per cent of audit fees and the second ranked firm has a 25 per cent market share. These 
results are comparable to those of Francis et al. (2005). 
22 I employ two market share definitions and the results are similar to the portfolio definition. The details are 
discussed in the additional tests.  
23 I also run all the tests with a larger sample of 520 IPO firms which includes auditors additional to the Big 7. In 
this sample, 32 IPO firms (6.15% ) hire 16 non Big-7 auditors, such as Crowe Chizek & Company LLP, McGladrey 
& Pullen LLP, Virchow Krause & Company LLP and Eide Bailly LLP. The results are similar to those presented.  
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Venture Capital  
To measure VC’s monitoring role at IPOs, I employ a dichotomous variable VC equal to 
one if an IPO is backed by VC, and zero otherwise. Hochberg (2008) finds that venture-backed 
IPO firms have lower levels of earnings management than similar non-venture-backed firms and 
are less likely to engage in aggressive accounting practices. His findings suggest that IPO firms 
are less likely to reqire an industry specialist auditor due to the monitoring role of VC. Therefore, 
I expect a negative association between VC and the choice of an industry expert auditor. 
Underwriters’ Reputation 
As discussed above, firms with more reputable underwriters are likely to choose industry 
expert auditors to protect the underwriters’ high reputation costs. Alternatively, reputable 
underwriters’ greater industry knowledge and understanding of proprietary costs could make an 
industry expert auditor less necessary. Therefore, I do not specify the direction of association 
between underwriter reputation and the choice of an industry expert auditor. I use Jay Ritter’s 
updated Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter reputation measures on the quality of the lead 
underwriter, UWrank.
24
 
Proprietary Costs 
I use two common measures of industry concentration to proxy for the level of proprietary 
costs, PropCost: a Herfindahl industry concentration index (HHI), and the four-firm industry 
concentration ratio (CON4). I also employ an inverse proxy for proprietary costs, capital 
intensity (CAPINTEN), measuring the barrier to entry (DeFond and Hung, 2003; Hou and 
Robinson, 2005).  
                                                             
24 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.  
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To construct the first two measures, I follow two steps: 1) compute HHI and CON4 at the 2-
digit SIC code level for each industry; 2) match the industry measure to each IPO firm’s primary 
2-digit SIC code.   
Industry Herfindahl index HHIj =   
       
      
 
 
 
    
Industry four-business concentration ratio (CON4j) =   
       
      
 
 
 
    
where, 
Salesij = Business i’s sales (segment i’s sales for segments of multisegment firms and firm i’s 
sales for single-segment firms) in industry j, as defined by 2-digit SIC code. 
Salesj = The sum of sales for all businesses (including segments of multisegment firms) in 
industry j. 
Salesij / Salesj = Business i’s market share 
m = 4 (i.e. the ratios are accumulated over the four largest businesses in industry j 
n = The number of businesses in industry j 
Larger HHIj and CON4j values correspond to greater industry concentration and to higher 
proprietary costs for industry j. I expect firms operating in such industries are less likely to 
choose industry expert auditors. 
The third proxy is the firm’s capital intensity (CAPINTEN), a proxy for barriers to entering 
an industry and an inverse proxy for proprietary costs. I measure capital intensity as the ratio of 
net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Prior studies document that as the 
threat of entry decreases firms are more likely to make voluntary disclosures to the capital 
market (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990). Therefore, I expect that IPO firms 
having higher capital intensity are more likely to choose industry expert auditors. 
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CEO Power 
I employ four proxies for CEO power at IPOs. CEOchair is coded as one if the CEO chairs 
the board of directors, and zero otherwise. CEOtenure equals the number of years the incumbent 
has served as CEO of the IPO firm. Klein (2002) provides evidence that boards structured to be 
more independent of the CEO are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial 
accounting process. Therefore, I expect negative coefficients for CEOchair and CEOtenure. 
Dichotomous variable CEOfounder is coded as one if the CEO is a founder of the IPO firm, and 
zero otherwise. Prior research documents mixed results regarding the role of founding CEOs on 
firms’ performance and financial reporting quality (Wang 2006; Billings and Lewis 2010). 
Therefore I make no directional predication for the sign of the coefficient of CEOfounder. 
CEOownership is defined as the aggregate number of shares held by the CEO, including 
restricted shares but excluding stock options (whether vested or unvested), expressed as a 
percentage of the IPO firm’s total shares outstanding. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that 
CEO ownership is positively associated with discretionary accruals. If CEOs having higher 
ownership prefer more leeway to manipulate earnings prior to IPOs, they are less likely to 
choose industry expert auditors. This scenario suggests a negative coefficient for CEOownership.  
Audit Committee Designation and Manager/Director Financial Expertise  
A dichotomous audit committee variable (AudCom) is coded as one if a firm has a 
designated audit committee prior to IPO, and as zero otherwise. Audit committee members’ and 
managers’ (CEO and CFO) financial expertise is measured in the fiscal year when the IPO 
occurs. I employ the following categories of financial expertise.
25
 (1) CAT1 = 1 if the individual 
is a CPA or has prior work experience in public accounting, otherwise equals 0. (2) CAT2 = 1 if 
individual has work experience as a chief financial officer, vice-president of finance, or 
                                                             
25 I follow the categories of financial expertise classified by Naiker and Sharma (2009).  
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controller, otherwise equals 0. (3) CAT3 = 1 if individual has other financial expertise: work 
experience as an investment banker, financial analyst, venture capitalist, or other financial 
management role, otherwise equals 0. (4) CAT4 = 1 if an individual has supervisory work 
experience as a chief executive officer or company president, otherwise equals zero. I use these 
categories to define the financial expertise of officers and directors as discussed below.  
Dichotomous variable AudComfe equals one if any of the following categories equals one 
for at least one member of a designated audit committee: CAT1, CAT2, or CAT3. Otherwise 
AudComfe equals zero. I exclude CAT4 because that definition of financial expertise is too 
broad to facilitate better financial reporting (Anderson et al. 2004; Carcello and Neal 2003; Lee 
et al. 2004; Defond et al. 2005). Dichotomous variable CEOfe equals one if any of the following 
categories equals one for the CEO, and zero otherwise: CAT1, CAT2, or CAT3. I exclude CAT4 
because that definition of financial expertise is too broad and because all CEOs have experience 
equivalent to company presidents. Dichotomous variable CFOfe is coded as one if CAT1 or 
CAT3 equals one for the CFO, and as zero otherwise. I exclude CAT4 because that definition of 
financial expertise is too broad, and CAT2 because all CFOs have experience as CFOs.  
When variable AudCom is used by itself (without AudComfe) to explain choice of an 
industry expert auditor, its coefficient captures the effect of a designated audit committee of 
average expertise on that choice. In other models, I employ both AudCom and AudCom 
interacted with AudComfe. In those models, AudCom captures the effect of a designated audit 
committee containing no financial experts. AudCom*AudComfe captures the incremental effect 
of a designated audit committee that has one or more financial experts. I expect the coefficients 
of both variables to be positive. I do not specify directional expectations for the two measures of 
managers’ financial expertise, CEOfe and CFOfe. 
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Firm Characteristics and Offerings  
In the absence of prior studies of IPO choice of industry specialist auditors, I generally 
expect such choice to be positively associated with greater IPO firm size, complexity and risk. I 
include the log of pre-IPO total assets (lnAT) to proxy for firm size. The log of the gross issue 
proceeds (lnPROCEEDS) provides an alternative proxy for size.
26
  The remaining variables 
serve as proxies for risk and complexity. DEBT is a measure of financial leverage, equal to total 
liabilities divided by total assets. I expect its coefficient to be positive. The natural logarithm of 
IPO firm age in years, lnFMAGE, can be viewed as an inverse proxy for information asymmetry. 
The longer an IPO company has existed, the more time there has been for investors and others to 
obtain information about it through means other than financial reports.
27
 I expect firm age to be 
negatively associated with demand for an industry expert auditor. I include FOREIGN to control 
for the complexities associated with IPO firms having foreign operations (proxied by the 
disclosure of foreign income taxes).
28
 Dichotomous variable LOSS is coded one if the client 
reports a loss in the IPO year, and as zero otherwise. Variable INVREC represents the firm’s 
inventories and accounts receivable scaled by total assets in the year prior to the IPO.  
I use the logit model and ordered logit model to test the choice of an industry specialist 
auditor as specified in Model (1) and Model (2): 
AUDindexp1,2 = β0 + β1 VC + β2UWRank + β3PropCost + β4CEOownership + β5CEOchair  
                                                             
26 When in a model that includes lnAT, lnPROCEEDS arguably could control for the incremental implicit insurance 
coverage provided by an industry expert auditor (Willenborg 1999). 
27 For example, an IPO firm that has been in existence for twenty years has established its economic viability in way 
that an IPO firm in existence for only three years has not. 
28 Studies of audit fee determinants suggest that foreign operations proxy for complexity and or risk, and are priced 
in audit fees (Willenborg 1999; Fargher et al. 2000; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003). This characteristic arguably could 
increase demand for an industry expert auditor. 
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+ β6CEOtenure + β7CEOfounder + β8 AudCom + β9AudComfe+ β10CEOfe + 
β11lnAT+ β12PROCEEDS + β13DEBT+ β14lnFMAGE+ β15FOREIGN + 
β16FOREIGN + β17LOSS + β18 INVREC + ε. (2) 
 
AUDindexp1,2 = β0 + β1 VC + β2UWRank + β3PropCost + β4CEOownership + β5CEOchair  
+ β6CEOtenure + β7CEOfounder + β8 AudCom + β9AudComfe  
+ β10AudComfe*AudCom + β11CEOfe + β12lnAT+ β13PROCEEDS  
+ β14DEBT+ β15lnFMAGE+ β16FOREIGN + β17FOREIGN + β18LOSS  
+ β19 INVREC + ε. (2) 
Models (1) and (2) are the same except for the addition of the interaction term 
AudComfe*AudCom in model (2). Models (1) and (2) are estimated using both a two-level 
dependent variable, AUDindepx1, and a four-level dependent variable, AUDindexp2. The 
variables are defined as follows. The models explaining the two-level dependent variable are 
estimated using logistic regression. The models explaining the four-level dependent variable are 
estimated using ordered logit. Variables are defined as follow. 
AUDindepx1 = 1 if the auditor is an industry expert at the national level, city 
level or both; 0 otherwise.  
AUDindexp2 = 3 if the auditor is a both national and city-level industry 
specialist; =2 if only a city-level industry specialist; =1 if only a 
national industry specialist; 0 otherwise.  
VC = 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital; 0 otherwise. 
UWrank = Ritter’s updated Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter reputation 
measure on the quality of the lead underwriter 
PropCost = a measure of proprietary cost: HHI, CON4, or CAPINTEN 
(proxies defined in text) 
CEOchair = 1 if the CEO is the chair of the board; 0 otherwise. 
CEOtenure = the number of years the CEO has held that position  
CEOfounder = 1 if the CEO is the founder of the IPO firm; 0 otherwise. 
CEOownership = the proportion of the firms’ outstanding shares owned by the 
CEO prior to IPO 
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AudCom = 1 if a designated audit committee exists prior to an IPO; 0 
otherwise. 
AudComfe 
= 1 if at least one AC member is a CPA, worked in public 
accounting firms, is an Accounting Expert (AE) or is a Financial 
Expert (FE); 0 otherwise. 
CEOfe = 1 if the CEO is a financial expert (defined in text); 0 otherwise 
CFOfe = 1 if the CFO is a financial expert (defined in text); 0 otherwise 
lnAT =ln of (pre-IPO total assets) 
lnPROCEEDS =ln of (IPO issue proceeds) 
DEBT =total liabilities/total assets 
FOREIGN =1 if foregin subsidariy present; 0 otherwise. 
lnFMAGE =ln of (IPO firm age) 
LOSS =1 if negative net income; 0 otherwise. 
INVREC =(inventory + accounts receivable)/total assets 
  
 
IV. RESULTS 
Results Explaining Choice of an Industry Expertise Auditor (Model 1&2) 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in estimating Model (1) and 
(2). About 12.5 percent of the sample employs an industry expert auditor (under any definition). 
Venture capital backing is obtained by 57.5 percent of the sample firms. IPO firms belong to 
moderately concentrated industries on average. CEOs of sample IPO firms tend to be powerful, 
with 32.1 percent being founders of the firms, 46.9 percent serving as chairs of their boards of 
directors, and having mean share ownership of 11.1 percent. The mean tenure of CEOs is about 
4.7 years. A strong majority of sample companies (91.5 percent) have designated audit 
committees prior to IPO. Of these, 19.2 percent have members who are financial experts. 
Financial expertise is somewhat common among CEOs (19.2 percent) and is more common 
among CFOs (45.3 percent). The mean (median) value for total assets (pre-logged) is about 353 
(593) million in US dollars. The mean (median) value for IPO proceeds (pre-logged) is about 
125 (129) million US dollars. Financial leverage is moderate with a mean liability-to-asset ratio 
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of 0.375. A minority of firms pay taxes on foreign income (37.9 percent). IPO firms are not very 
profitable, with about one half reporting losses in the IPO year. 
(Insert Table 4 about Here) 
Table 5 presents the logit regression results of estimating Model (1), which examines the 
relation between the various factors and IPO firms’ choice to employ an industry expert auditor, 
with expertise measured as a dichotomous variable. The results show that the presence of a VC is 
negatively related to the choice of an industry expert auditor when proprietary costs are proxied 
by the Herfindahl index and a four-firm concentration (p-value=0.004). This relation is not 
significant when proprietary cost is proxied by capital intensity. I argue that the Herfindahl index 
and four-firm concentration ratios are more reliable proxies for powerful competitors. All three 
proprietary cost proxy coefficients have signs consistent with the prediction that IPO firms are 
less likely to hire industry expert auditors when proprietary costs are present. CEO and CFO 
characteristics are not associated with industry expert auditor choice in Table 5.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, existence of a designated audit committee is not associated with choice of industry 
expert auditors. Natural log of firm age is negatively and significantly associated with choice of 
expert auditor, consistent with the idea that it proxies for a ‘track record’ of economic viability. 
Two other company characteristics are associated with auditor choice at marginal levels of 
significance. Choice of an industry expert is more likely for firms having greater financial 
leverage, and those having foreign operations. 
(Insert Table 5 about Here) 
Table 6 presents the logit regression results of estimating Model (2). Most of the results are 
similar to those presented in Table 5. Table 6 shows that at IPOs, AC members’ financial 
expertise is not related to the company’s choice of industry expert auditors.   
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(Insert Table 6 about Here) 
Table 7 and Table 8 present the ordered logit regression results of estimating model (1) and 
model (2) respectively. Results are highly consistent with those shown in Tables 5 and 6. One 
difference is that the coefficients of DEBT are positive and significant in Tables 7 and 8 but not 
in Tables 5 and 6.  
(Insert Tables 7 and 8 about Here) 
Additional Tests 
Audit industry specialist 
I also employ two market share measures of audit industry specialist.  One identifies a 
national (city) level industry specialist if in a particular year the auditor has the largest market 
share in a two-digit SIC industry in the nation (or in the particular city). Market shares are based 
on audit fees (Francis et al. 2005; Ferguson et al. 2003).
29
 IPO companies’ auditors’ cities are 
identified by Audit Analytics from audit reports found in Form 10-K filings. I find that 10.0 
percent of IPO firms are audited by joint national and city industry specialists, 16.6 percent by 
city-only industry specialists, and 15.6 percent by national-only industry specialists. In 
untabulated data, Ernst & Young (EY) is the national level leader in more two digit industries 
than any other auditor (N = 13 two-digit SIC industries). PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) is the 
second place national level leader, with N = 11. At the city level, Ernst & Young (EY) is again 
the leader with N=15, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) is again the second with N=14.  
The second market share measure identifies a national level (city level) industry specialist in 
a particular year if the auditor has the largest market share in a two-digit SIC industry in the 
nation (in the city), and if its market share is at least ten percentage points greater than the 
                                                             
29 I also measure the market share using client sales revenue and total assets. The results are similar to those 
discussed and presented.  
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second largest in the national (city) audit market. Market shares again are based on audit fees. 
Using this more stringent definition, I find that 5.1 percent of IPO firms are audited by joint 
national and city specialists, 15.4 percent by city-only industry specialists, and 7.0 percent by 
national-only industry specialists. In untabulated data, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) is the 
national level leader in more two digit industries than any other auditor (N = 18 two-digit SIC 
industries). Ernst & Young (EY) is the second place national level leader, with N = 14. At the 
city level, Ernst & Young (EY) is the leader with N=16, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) is 
the second with N=14. Among the Big 7, the market shares in joint national and city specialists, 
national-level industry specialists, and city-level specialists, are similar to those reported for the 
first definition.  The untabulated regression results are similar to the results using the portfolio 
measure and previously presented.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I propose and test a model of the determinants of IPO firms’ choice to employ 
industry expert auditors. My paper extends prior research concerning the determinants of 
industry specialist auditor choice by mature companies. I find that venture capital backing, and 
proprietary costs, are negatively associated with choice of industry expert auditors at IPOs. I 
argue that the monitoring and industry expertise provided by venture capitalists serve as 
substitutes for industry expert auditors. Proprietary costs are particularly salient when IPO 
companies first begin to disclose financial information publicly, including to competitors who 
are more powerful and mature. My results are consistent with prior evidence that mature clients 
often prefer not to be audited by the same auditors who also serve their direct competitors. IPO 
firm age is negatively associated with choice of industry expert auditors. I interpret this as 
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evidence that information asymmetry between IPO companies and potential investors is reduced 
when IPO firms have extensive ‘track records’. Several factors prove to be surprisingly (in my 
view) unimportant in IPO auditor choice. These include measures of CEO power, CEO and CFO 
financial expertise, and existence or non-existence of a designated audit committee at IPO. In 
addition, several measures of IPO firm size, complexity and risk are not associated (or only 
marginally associated) with industry expert auditor choice. 
Like any empirical study, this study has some limitations.  Most notably, although I use 
three measures of auditor industry expertise, and obtain similar results, all three are subject to 
measurement errors which could influence the interpretation of my results. Another limitation 
arises when operationalizing the measures of CEO and CFO financial expertise. I focus on IPO 
firms that disclose detailed backgrounds for top managers and board members. The extent to 
which these disclosures are inaccurate or incomplete will introduce error in my measures of 
financial expertise. Finally, as with any empirical study, the possibility exists that important 
explanatory variables have been omitted. This possibility is greater in studies (such as this one) 
for which prior literature provides limited guidance.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection  
  
Data screening procedures: 
Number of 
Observation 
  Initial Public Offering issued in US (2000-2010) 2,155 
Less: 
 Financial and utility firms 692 
(SIC codes: 6000-6999 and 4900-4949) 
 Exclude All Closed-end Fund/Trusts 15 
Unit Issues 13 
Spinoff (Equity Carve-out)  57 
Offer Price < 5 (US$) 77 
Non-US Public Marketplace 208 
Foreign Firms 20 
Prospectus Missing 24 
Observations not covered by Compustat and Audit Analytics 206 
Observations not using ‘Big 7’ auditors     58 
Observations with missing values for Management and/or Board  161 
Observations with missing values for variables 136 
IPO offerings sample 488 
 
Note: In this study ‘Big 7’ describes the former Big 5 plus Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman 
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Table 2: Sample Distribution by Year 
Fiscal 
year 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
2000 117 23.98 117 23.98 
2001 25 5.12 142 29.10 
2002 30 6.15 172 35.25 
2003 28 5.74 200 40.98 
2004 70 14.34 270 55.33 
2005 52 10.66 322 65.98 
2006 66 13.52 388 79.51 
2007 73 14.96 461 94.47 
2008 9 1.84 470 96.31 
2009 18 3.69 488 100.00 
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Table 3: Distribution of IPO Firms by Industry and Auditor (for all sample years)  
 
    Auditor  
SIC 
code 
Industry Description 
Pricewaterhouse
Coopers 
 Ernst 
& 
Young 
Deloitte & 
Touche 
KPMG  
Arthur 
Andersen 
Grant 
Thornton 
BDO 
Seidman 
Total 
Number 
Percent 
  
  Number of IPO clients / Percent of IPO sample 
12 Coal mining 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
  0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.61 
13 Oil and gas extraction 0 4 2 3 1 6 0 16 
  0 0.82 0.41 0.61 0.2 1.23 0 3.28 
15 General building 
contractors 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
17 Special trade contractors 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
20 Food and kindred 
products 
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
  0 0 0.41 0 0 0 0 0.41 
24 Lumber and wood 
products 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
25 
Furniture 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
  0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.41 
27 Printing and publishing 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 4 
  0.2 0.41 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.82 
28 Chemicals and allied 
products 
19 36 4 3 3 1 1 67 
  3.89 7.38 0.82 0.61 0.61 0.2 0.2 13.73 
29 Petroleum and coal 
products 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
    0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.2 
30 Rubber and other plastic 
products 
2 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 
  0.41 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 1.02 
31 Leather products 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
    0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.2 
32 Glass products 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
    0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
33 Primary metal industries 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 4 
    0 0 0.41 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.82 
35 Industrial machinery and 
equipment 
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 16 
    1.02 0.82 0.61 0.41 0.2 0 0.2 3.28 
36 Electrical and electronic 
equipment 
18 15 7 4 4 2 0 50 
    3.69 3.07 1.43 0.82 0.82 0.41 0 10.25 
37 Transportation equipment 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 6 
    0 0.61 0.61 0 0 0 0 1.23 
38 Instruments and related 
products 
13 18 6 2 3 4 0 46 
  2.66 3.69 1.23 0.41 0.61 0.82 0 9.43 
39 Other manufacturing 
industries 
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
    0 0.41 0 0 0 0 0 0.41 
41 Passage transit 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
    0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
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42 Motor freight 
transportation  
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
    0.41 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.61 
44 Water transportation 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
    0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
45 Transportation by air 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
  0 0.41 0 0 0 0 0 0.41 
46 Pipelines, except natural 
gas 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
    0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 
47 Transportation 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
    0.2 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.41 
48 Communications 4 5 4 3 2 0 1 19 
    0.82 1.02 0.82 0.61 0.41 0 0.2 3.89 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary 
services 
0 0 1 3 0 1 0 5 
    0 0 0.2 0.61 0 0.2 0 1.02 
50 Wholesale trade –durable 
goods 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
    0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0.61 
53 General merchandise 
stores 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
    0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
54 Retail – food and 
groceries 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
    0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.41 
55 Retail – auto and home 
supplies 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
    0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.41 
56 Retail - apparel and 
accessary stores 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
    0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 
57 Retail – consumer 
electronics 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
    0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 
58 Eating and drinking 
places 
2 1 2 4 1 0 0 10 
    0.41 0.2 0.41 0.82 0.2 0 0 2.05 
59 Miscellaneous retail 3 5 5 2 0 0 0 15 
    0.61 1.02 1.02 0.41 0 0 0 3.07 
70 Hotel, rooming houses, 
camps, etc. 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
    0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 0.41 
72 Personal services 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
    0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
73 Business services 27 44 24 22 11 4 4 136 
    5.53 9.02 4.92 4.51 2.25 0.82 0.82 27.87 
78 Motion pictures 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
    0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0.41 
79 Amusement and 
recreational services 
1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 
    0.2 0 0.41 0 0 0 0 0.61 
80 Health services 3 13 1 1 0 0 1 19 
    0.61 2.66 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.2 3.89 
82 Educational services 1 3 1 0 0 0 1 6 
    0.2 0.61 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 1.23 
87 Engineering and 
management services 
7 6 3 2 1 2 0 21 
    1.43 1.23 0.61 0.41 0.2 0.41 0 4.3 
Total Number 116 171 81 62 27 21 10 488 
Percent 23.77 35.04 16.6 12.7 5.53 4.3 2.05 100 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Models (1) and (2)  (N=488) 
   
            
Variable name Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
AUDindepx1 0.125 0.000 0.331 0.000 1.000 
AUDindexp2 0.248 0.000 0.676 0.000 3.000 
VC 0.575 1.000 0.495 0.000 1.000 
UWrank 3.937 8.001 7.524 -9.000 9.001 
HHI 476.712 390.748 374.206 122.674 2949.600 
CON4 0.375 0.361 0.125 0.180 0.903 
CAPINTEN 0.178 0.090 0.197 0.045 0.813 
CEOfounder 0.321 0.000 0.467 0.000 1.000 
CEOchair 0.469 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
CEOownership 0.111 0.049 0.168 0.000 0.995 
CEOtenure 4.733 4.000 4.769 0.000 40.000 
AudCom 0.915 1.000 0.279 0.000 1.000 
AudComfe 0.225 0.000 0.418 0.000 1.000 
CEOfe 0.192 0.000 0.394 0.000 1.000 
CFOfe 0.963 1.000 0.188 0.000 1.000 
lnAT 4.386 4.104 1.472 1.401 8.110 
INVREC 0.170 0.133 0.154 0.000 0.742 
lnPROCEEDS 0.375 0.298 0.262 0.029 1.400 
DEBT 4.521 4.411 0.780 2.773 6.867 
lnFMAGE 2.325 2.197 0.907 0.000 4.796 
FOREIGN 0.379 0.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 
LOSS 0.512 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
 
AUDindepx1 = 1 if the auditor is an industry expert at the national level, city level or both; 0 otherwise.  
AUDindexp2 = 3 if the B4auditor is a both national and city-level industry specialist;  
=2 if only a city-level industry specialist; =1 if only a national industry specialist; 0 otherwise.  
VC = 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital; 0 otherwise. 
UWrank = Ritter’s updated Carter-Manaster (1990) underwriter reputation measure on the quality of the lead underwriter. 
HHI =Herfindahl Index (Proprietary Cost proxy defined in text). 
CON4 =Four-firm concentration ratios (Proprietary Cost proxy defined in text). 
CAPINTEN = Capital Intensity (Proprietary Cost proxy defined in text). 
CEOfounder = 1 if the CEO is the founder of the IPO firm; 0 otherwise. 
CEOchair = 1 if the CEO is the chair of the board; 0 otherwise. 
CEOownership = the proportion of the firms’ outstanding shares owned by the CEO prior to IPO 
CEOtenure = the number of years the CEO has held that position 
AudCom = 1 if a designated audit committee exists prior to an IPO; 0 otherwise. 
AudComfe = 1 if at least one AC member is a CPA, worked in public accounting firms, is an Accounting Expert (AE) 
or is a Financial Expert (FE); 0 otherwise. 
CEOfe = 1 if the CEO is a financial expert (defined in text); 0 otherwise 
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CFOfe = 1 if the CFO is a financial expert (defined in text); 0 otherwise 
lnAT =ln of (pre-IPO total assets) 
INVREC =(inventory + accounts receivable)/total assets 
lnPROCEEDS =ln of (IPO issue proceeds) 
DEBT =total liabilities/total assets 
lnFMAGE =ln of (IPO firm age) 
FOREIGN =1 if foregin subsidariy present; 0 otherwise. 
LOSS =1 if negative net income; 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Employing an Industry Specialist 
Auditor  (Model 1 logit regression) 
    
Independent 
Variable 
Prediction 
Sign 
Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value 
          
Intercept ? 1.490 0.253  2.457 0.076  0.395 0.757 
VC - -0.816 0.016  -0.822 0.016  -0.414 0.243 
UWrank +/- -0.004 0.832  -0.001 0.940  -0.006 0.765 
HHI - -0.003 0.096       
CON4 -    -6.753 0.004    
CAPINTEN +       2.110 0.010 
CEOfounder +/- -0.277 0.411  -0.307 0.362  -0.262 0.452 
CEOchair - -0.434 0.148  -0.360 0.239  -0.447 0.145 
CEOownership - 1.170 0.162  1.152 0.165  1.129 0.118 
CEOtenure - 0.025 0.529  0.024 0.553  0.028 0.450 
AudCom + 0.354 0.543  0.407 0.483  0.352 0.485 
CEOfe +/- -0.404 0.301  -0.395 0.319  -0.371 0.332 
CFOfe +/- -0.723 0.341  -0.655 0.395  -0.829 0.189 
lnAT + -0.109 0.537  -0.133 0.454  -0.194 0.298 
INVREC  + 0.813 0.444  1.174 0.269  1.155 0.279 
DEBT + 1.146 0.123  1.132 0.125  0.981 0.171 
lnPROCEEDS + -0.058 0.817  -0.050 0.843  -0.082 0.745 
lnFMAGE - -0.708 0.001  -0.677 0.002  -0.817 0.000 
FOREIGN + 0.461 0.110  0.528 0.073  0.591 0.044 
LOSS + 0.250 0.408  0.257 0.404  0.382 0.199 
Observations  488   488   488  
Pseudo-R square  15.2%   16.73%   13.41%  
 
Note: Three models are presented: one for each of the three measures of proprietary cost (HHI, CON4, 
CAPINTEN). See Table 3 variable definitions. P-values are two-tailed. 
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Table 6: Determinants of Employing an Industry Specialist Auditor  
(Model 2 logit regression) 
   
          
Independent 
Variable 
Prediction 
Sign 
Estimate P-value   Estimate P-value   Estimate P-value 
          
Intercept ? 1.565 0.248  2.533 0.077  0.491 0.929 
VC - -0.795 0.024  -0.802 0.024  -0.397 0.347 
UWrank +/- -0.003 0.884  0.000 0.994  -0.004 0.856 
HHI - -0.003 0.098       
CON4 -    -6.750 0.004    
CAPINTEN +       2.180 0.007 
CEOFounder +/- -0.265 0.443  -0.299 0.389  -0.237 0.505 
CEOchair - -0.427 0.156  -0.351 0.252  -0.442 0.153 
CEOownership - 1.164 0.171  1.148 0.172  1.086 0.132 
CEOtenure - 0.025 0.546  0.024 0.568  0.030 0.435 
AudCom + 0.193 0.781  0.241 0.731  0.146 0.785 
AudComfe + -0.711 0.552  -0.731 0.544  -0.924 0.445 
AudCom*AudComfe + 0.473 0.704  0.497 0.693  0.607 0.632 
CEOfe +/- -0.421 0.283  -0.413 0.300  -0.379 0.319 
CFOfe +/- -0.694 0.372  -0.625 0.427  -0.780 0.221 
lnAT + -0.112 0.530  -0.139 0.441  -0.206 0.274 
INVREC  + 0.810 0.450  1.166 0.279  1.207 0.262 
DEBT + 1.135 0.142  1.130 0.142  0.979 0.179 
lnPROCEEDS + -0.036 0.892  -0.025 0.924  -0.050 0.852 
lnFMAGE - -0.704 0.001  -0.674 0.002  -0.824 0.000 
FOREIGN + 0.472 0.102  0.539 0.068  0.605 0.041 
LOSS + 0.229 0.460  0.234 0.459  0.364 0.227 
Observations  488   488   488  
Pseudo-R square  15.45%   16.97%   13.84%  
 
Note: Three models are presented: one for each of the three measures of proprietary cost (HHI, CON4, 
CAPINTEN). See Table 3 variable definitions. P-values are two-tailed. 
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Table 7: Determinants of Employing an Industry Specialist Auditor 
(Model 1 Ordered Logit Regression) 
   
          
Independent 
Variable 
Prediction 
Sign 
Estimate P-value   Estimate P-value   Estimate P-value 
          
Intercept3 ? -0.649 0.641  0.321 0.824  -1.832 0.192 
Intercept2 ? 1.845 0.173  2.830 0.045  0.659 0.628 
Intercept1 ? 1.986 0.142  2.973 0.035  0.800 0.556 
VC - -0.763 0.029  -0.768 0.031  -0.357 0.336 
UWrank +/- 0.000 0.999  0.003 0.887  -0.002 0.902 
HHI - -0.003 0.003       
CON4 -    -6.946 0.000    
CAPINTEN +       2.090 0.006 
CEOfounder +/- -0.323 0.337  -0.355 0.292  -0.312 0.362 
CEOchair - -0.419 0.192  -0.348 0.283  -0.439 0.174 
CEOownership - 1.256 0.133  1.248 0.139  1.193 0.167 
CEOtenure - 0.024 0.498  0.022 0.529  0.025 0.467 
AudCom + 0.258 0.643  0.309 0.582  0.256 0.645 
CEOfe +/- -0.348 0.378  -0.338 0.395  -0.325 0.411 
CFOfe +/- -0.826 0.185  -0.765 0.222  -0.879 0.157 
lnAT + -0.117 0.540  -0.144 0.455  -0.190 0.321 
INVREC  + 0.793 0.446  1.159 0.271  1.014 0.341 
DEBT + 1.398 0.047  1.401 0.047  1.164 0.091 
lnPROCEEDS + -0.138 0.623  -0.129 0.645  -0.160 0.562 
lnFMAGE - -0.716 0.001  -0.684 0.001  -0.825 <.0001 
FOREIGN + 0.474 0.098  0.542 0.062  0.600 0.039 
LOSS + 0.254 0.451  0.265 0.441  0.384 0.255 
Observations  488   488   488  
Pseudo-R square  13.94%   15.32%   12.13%  
Note: Three models are presented: one for each of the three measures of proprietary cost (HHI, CON4, 
CAPINTEN). See Table 3 variable definitions. P-values are two-tailed. 
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Table 8: Determinants of Employing an Industry Specialist Auditor (Model 2)  
          
Independent 
Variable 
Prediction 
Sign 
Estimate P-value   Estimate P-value   Estimate P-value 
          
Intercept3 ? -0.532 0.705  0.442 0.762  -1.683 0.238 
Intercept2 ? 1.969 0.151  2.959 0.039  0.818 0.555 
Intercept1 ? 2.110 0.124  3.101 0.030  0.960 0.489 
VC - -0.745 0.035  -0.750 0.037  -0.347 0.354 
UWrank +/- 0.002 0.925  0.005 0.808  0.000 0.981 
HHI - -0.003 0.003       
CON4 -    -6.956 0.000    
CAPINTEN +       2.167 0.005 
CEOFounder +/- -0.317 0.349  -0.354 0.297  -0.292 0.397 
CEOchair - -0.405 0.209  -0.332 0.308  -0.430 0.184 
CEOownership - 1.255 0.137  1.247 0.143  1.142 0.191 
CEOtenure - 0.024 0.497  0.022 0.526  0.028 0.414 
AudCom + 0.016 0.980  0.055 0.930  -0.015 0.980 
AudComfe + -1.007 0.440  -1.052 0.425  -1.164 0.359 
AudCom*AudComfe + 0.737 0.589  0.784 0.570  0.814 0.541 
CEOfe +/- -0.374 0.349  -0.365 0.363  -0.336 0.401 
CFOfe +/- -0.799 0.203  -0.735 0.245  -0.840 0.178 
lnAT + -0.125 0.518  -0.154 0.427  -0.205 0.289 
INVREC  + 0.799 0.443  1.159 0.271  1.088 0.307 
DEBT + 1.380 0.055  1.391 0.054  1.165 0.096 
lnPROCEEDS + -0.102 0.721  -0.089 0.756  -0.119 0.674 
lnFMAGE - -0.715 0.001  -0.685 0.001  -0.843 <.0001 
FOREIGN + 0.494 0.085  0.561 0.054  0.622 0.034 
LOSS + 0.236 0.488  0.245 0.479  0.369 0.275 
Observations  488   488   488  
Pseudo-R square  14.13%   15.70%   12.69%  
Note: Three models are presented: one for each of the three measures of proprietary cost (HHI, CON4, 
CAPINTEN). See Table 3 variable definitions. P-values are two-tailed. 
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An Investigation of Financial Expertise Improvement among CFOs 
Hired Following Restatements  
Abstract: We examine whether restatement companies experiencing chief financial officer 
(CFO) turnover hire new CFOs with more financial expertise. Our study is motivated by recent 
high-profile financial scandals and increasing instances of restatements which focus public 
attention on the role of CFOs in maintaining the integrity and quality of corporate financial 
reporting. Our results provide some (albeit weak) support that restating firms are more likely to 
hire new CFOs with greater accounting knowledge and overall CFO qualification (both 
accounting knowledge and CFO work experience) than non-restating firms. Furthermore, we 
also find that the number of restating years has a positive effect on CFO qualification 
improvement. Although we fail to find strong evidence for our hypotheses, we provide the first 
evidence on the relation between CFO qualification improvement and restatement. The results 
extend our understanding of companies’ strategies for regaining reporting credibility in the wake 
of restatements.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We examine whether restatement companies experiencing chief financial officer (CFO) 
turnover hire new CFOs with more financial expertise. The results extend our understanding of 
companies’ strategies for regaining reporting credibility in the wake of restatements. 
Restatements of erroneous accounting numbers (primarily earnings) have led to significant losses 
for investors, contributed to a series of corporate governance reforms and legislative changes 
including SOX 2002, and prompted efforts to identify the remedies restating firms take to 
improve reporting quality and restore credibility (Farber 2005; Hennes et al. 2011; Ettredge et al. 
2012).  
Substantial prior research investigates the role of CFOs in the misstatement and restatement 
context. CFOs appear to engage in earnings manipulation primarily as a result of pressure from 
CEOs (Feng et al. 2011). Companies whose CFOs are more financially literate are less likely to 
generate misstatements (Aier et al.2005). CFOs whose companies restate financial reports are 
more likely to be replaced (Aier et al. 2005; Feng et al. 2011), especially if the misstatements 
consist of irregularities rather than errors (Hennes et al. 2008). CFOs of restating firms suffer 
more severe labor market penalties when they lose their jobs, than those of non-restating firms 
(Agrawal and Cooper 2007; Arthaud-Day et al. 2006). Prior research has not investigated the 
financial expertise of new CFOs hired subsequent to restatements.  
In a different but related context, Li et al.(2010) find that companies whose auditors report 
they have internal control material weaknesses under SOX Section 404 experience greater CFO 
turnover.
30
 They also find that the newly hired CFOs often have better financial qualifications 
                                                             
30 Material weakness is the key concept in evaluating the effectiveness of the companies’ internal control over 
financial reporting (ICOFR). A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, that results in 
a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be 
prevented or detected (PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, 2007).  
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than the CFOs they replace. Furthermore, on average, only companies with new CFOs who have 
greater financial expertise than their predecessors experience subsequent improvement in 
auditors’ SOX 404 reports. The Li et al. (2010) results suggest that a different type of blow to the 
credibility of a company’s financial reporting (a restatement) is likely to be accompanied by 
CFO turnover, that the new CFOs hired often will have greater financial expertise than those 
they replace, and that hiring improved CFOs could enable restatement companies to more 
successfully mitigate the effects of restatements in the future.  
CFOs typically are responsible for their companies’ financial reporting (Li et al.2010). 
Specifically, CFOs oversee the implementation of accounting principles and procedures, oversee 
the preparation of financial reports, and make accounting related decisions (such as choosing 
accounting methods and overseeing accounting adjustments). Their financial expertise likely 
affects their capability to carry out such critical tasks. For instance, accounting literacy probably 
impacts CFOs’ understanding and application of accounting principles. Financial working 
experience potentially affects CFOs’ ability to effectively monitor accounting personnel and 
maintain internal controls, and to work closely with the audit committee and external auditors. 
On the other hand, some evidence suggests that in the late 1990s, even as the environment 
and nature of corporate accounting became increasingly complicated, and as numbers of 
accounting restatements increased, the accounting knowledge of CFOs became less important to 
corporate employers (McCarty, 1999; Jones, 2000; Kahn, 2002). A 2001 survey by Spencer 
Stuart (a headhunting firm) showed that only 20 percent of CFOs at Fortune 500 companies held 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) certificates, 35 percent had M.B.A.s, and five percent had 
both (Economist 2002).
31
 Given the responsibility of CFOs for financial reporting, and the trend 
                                                             
31 Aier et al. (2005) provide a discussion of the trend toward decreased CFO financial expertise in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. 
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of decreased CFOs’ financial expertise, Aier et al. (2005) suggest that this trend may have 
contributed to the increased number of restatements. In addition, Aier et al. (2005) report that 
companies whose CFOs have greater financial expertise are less likely to experience 
misstatements and restatements. Thus, it is interesting to explore whether restating firms will 
remedy financial reporting problems by hiring better qualified CFOs. 
Based on prior research, we argue that restating companies experiencing CFO turnovers are 
more likely to hire new CFOs with greater financial expertise than those they replace as 
compared to new CFOs hired by non-restating firms. Restating firms have a stronger motivation 
to hire CFOs with greater financial expertise to improve financial reporting than do non-restating 
firms. 
We focus on the financial expertise of restatement firms’ successor CFOs for the following 
reasons. As discussed above, CFOs typically are responsible for the quality of their firms’ 
financial reports. Compared to other top corporate officers, CFOs are in a unique position to 
resist CEO pressure to carry out accounting manipulations (e.g., structuring transactions to 
window dress financial numbers, applying accounting methods incorrectly, and using biased 
estimates to achieve earnings benchmarks). CFOs also are well placed to reduce the probability 
of reporting errors and irregularities. We argue that the mere replacement of CFOs will not 
necessarily improve reporting quality or convince investors that it has improved. Instead, CFOs 
having greater financial expertise than their predecessors are more likely to have the credibility, 
professional reputation, and technical knowledge to prevent errors and to resist CEO pressure to 
commit irregularities. 
This study contributes to both the restatement and management turnover literatures. Prior 
restatement studies mostly focus on the causes and consequences of restatements. Studies 
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devoted to whether and how restating firms improve their financial reporting credibility 
document that they make improvements to their boards of directors, audit committees, and other 
governance characteristics (Farber, 2005). Restating companies also replace CEOs (Desai et al., 
2006), and reduce option-based compensation of CEOs (Qiang and Farber 2008). Prior 
restatement studies have not investigated changes in qualifications of the officer directly 
responsible for financial reporting, the CFO. This study examines changes in CFO financial 
expertise, and also investigates whether companies’ tendency to hire improved CFOs is 
influenced by the seriousness of the misstatements corrected.  
Restatements are events that correct accounting errors and irregularities made by companies 
reporting under U.S. GAAP. Our analysis focuses on restatements announced from 2003 to 2010. 
This period begins in the year immediately following the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002).
32
 The 
sample consists of 160 companies experiencing CFO turnover: 80 restating firms and 80 
matched non-restating firms. Our empirical results are summarized as follows. First, we find 
some evidence that restating companies experiencing CFO turnover are more likely than non-
restatement control firms to hire new CFOs with greater financial expertise (in terms of 
accounting knowledge and overall CFO qualifications).
33
 Second, the results suggest that, among 
restating companies experiencing CFO turnover, the number of periods restated is positively 
associated with the likelihood of hiring CFOs with greater financial expertise. Nevertheless, our 
results do not provide strong support for our hypotheses. This could be due in part to the small 
                                                             
32 The number of restatements correcting accounting errors dramatically increased around 2002, the 
year SOX was passed (GAO-06-678 [GAO 2006], GAO-06-1053R [GAO 2007]). We start our sample period 
after SOX to avoid its effect on the results.      
33 Overall CFO qualifications improvement (CFOIMPORVE) is defined as greater accounting 
knowledge and more work experience as a CFO. 
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number of sample firms meeting our data requirements. Alternatively, it is possible that boards 
of directors of restating companies do not focus on the financial expertise of newly hired CFOs. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section II reviews relevant past 
literature on restatement and management turnover and our hypotheses. Section III discusses the 
data and our regression models. Empirical results are discussed in Section IV. Section V 
concludes the paper.  
 
II. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
Restatement companies experience adverse consequences following restatement 
announcements. These consequences, including loss of credibility and lower earnings quality 
perceived by investors, are accompanied by a variety of adverse effects. For example, Karpoff et 
al. (2008) and Wu (2002) report that stock prices decrease when financial misrepresentations are 
publicly disclosed. Investors likely require higher compensation for holding stocks of restating 
firms because they are concerned about quality of future financial statements, and the perceived 
credibility and competence of management. Consistent with this scenario, Hribar and Jenkins 
(2004) find increased cost of equity capital after restatements. Similarly, from the analyst 
perspective, accounting restatements represent both diminished company prospects and increased 
risk/uncertainty, which lead to more dispersed analyst earnings forecasts and more negative 
forecast revisions (Palmrose et al. 2004). In all these situations, shareholders lose confidence in 
the company. 
The loss of credibility can have even more serious consequences to restating firms. 
Stockholders can resort to the legal system to regain the stock losses due to misstatements. 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find greater frequency of shareholder lawsuits following 
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restatements, accompanied by higher settlement amounts. Karpoff et al. (2008) document that 
penalties from shareholder lawsuits reach 23.6 million dollars per restating firm on average. 
The adverse consequences discussed above should provide strong motivation for restating 
firms to improve earnings quality and restore their reporting credibility. The existing literature 
documents various actions restatement companies take to improve performance and restore trust. 
Restating firms make various changes, ranging from altering their accounting policies to 
restructuring corporate governance. For instance, restating firms voluntarily switch to more 
conservative income recognition methods in the post-restatement period (Ettredge et al. 2012). In 
addition, the boards of directors of restating firms strengthen their monitoring of executives. 
Farber (2005) reports that firms fraudulently manipulating their financial reports subsequently 
increase the numbers and percentages of outside directors on their boards. Investors appear to 
react positively to such changes. Qiang and Farber (2008) find that firms that restate their 
earnings re-contract with their CEOs by reducing their option-based compensation. This 
reduction results in improved firm performance. 
While restating firms have strong incentives to improve CFO expertise that might prevent 
future earnings errors or irregularities, prior research has yet to examine whether firms hire 
CFOs with more financial expertise as an attempt to re-establish financial reporting credibility, to 
improve earnings quality, and/or to mitigate and prevent financial reporting problems. Hennes et 
al. (2008) find that CFO turnover increases among restatement companies in the post-SOX 
period, but only for companies correcting irregularities (intentional misstatements) as opposed to 
errors (unintentional misstatements). Collins et al. (2009) document increased involuntary 
turnover among CFOs of restating firms that is not affected by passage of SOX, and they report 
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that such departing CFOs experience reduced employment opportunities. Neither of these studies, 
however, examines the financial qualifications of departing or newly hired CFOs. 
 One purpose of this study is to investigate the financial expertise of CFOs hired following 
earnings restatements and compare it to the expertise of departing CFOs. As such, it contributes 
to more complete understanding of the various steps companies take to repair their reputations 
for providing credible financial information following restatements.     
We predict that, in addition to the changes outlined above, restating companies often attempt 
to improve the financial expertise of their CFOs. Aier et al. (2005) provide evidence that 
companies whose CFOs have greater financial expertise are less likely to restate their financial 
reports. In a different setting, Li et al. (2010) document that firms whose auditors assess internal 
control material weakness under SOX Section 404 are more likely to terminate their CFOs and 
hire new CFOs with greater financial expertise, compared to companies receiving favorable SOX 
404 reports. Among firms hiring new CFOs, they observe improvement in SOX 404 internal 
control opinions only when the new CFOs have better financial expertise than their predecessors. 
Therefore, we expect to observe that restating firms are likely to hire new CFOs with greater 
financial expertise as a means to improve reporting quality and restore credibility. Our first 
hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H1: Restating companies experiencing CFO turnover are more likely to hire new CFOs with 
greater financial expertise, compared to their predecessors, than are control firms hiring new 
CFOs.  
We test H1 by contrasting the subset of restatement companies having CFO turnover with a 
control sample of non-restatement companies having CFO turnover. CFO turnover sometimes 
occurs prior to the initiation of misstatements, presumably because the former CFO resists CEO 
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pressure to misstate (Feng et al. 2011). We view the CFOs in place when restatements are 
announced as responsible for the misstatements. We treat CFO turnover occurring within one 
year after restatements as likely motivated by the restatements.  
Our second hypothesis examines the characteristics of restatements that are more likely to 
trigger firms to hire new CFOs with greater financial expertise. Palmrose et al.(2004) and Wu 
(2002) report that restatement materiality is negatively related to stock return around the 
announcement of restatements. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that greater materiality 
increases the likelihood of shareholder lawsuits. We predict that more material restatements, 
given their adverse consequences, are more likely to cause boards to hire a new CFO with better 
qualifications. Therefore, our second hypothesis is: 
H2: Restating companies experiencing CFO turnover and having more material restatements 
are more likely to hire new CFOs with greater financial expertise, than are restating 
companies experiencing CFO turnover and having less material restatements.  
We test H2 using only the sample of restatement companies having CFO turnover. Our 
explanatory test variables include six proxies for materiality of misstatements, including restated 
amount (AMOUNT), revenue restatement (REVENUE), the number of accounts restated 
(NACCOUNTS), the number of restated years (YRS), press-release disclosed restatement 
(PRESS) and regulatory investigation (REVINVEST). 
Next, we examine whether incentives to hire new CFOs with greater financial expertise 
differ for firms with different types of misstatements (i.e., irregularities vs. errors).
34
 Hennes et al. 
(2008) highlight the importance of distinguishing between intentional financial misstatements 
and unintentional ones because combining the two types of misstatements can lead to incorrect 
                                                             
34 Irregularities refer to intentional misstatements while errors refer to unintentional misapplications of GAAP. See 
AU Section 316 (PCAOB, 2002).  
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inferences. For example, greater CFO financial expertise might be more effective in preventing 
errors than irregularities. Accordingly, we separately examine the improvement of financial 
expertise for new CFOs of firms restating errors versus irregularities. We predict that restating 
firms can reduce the likelihood of future errors by hiring CFOs having better financial expertise. 
Errors arguably occur because CFOs lack accounting knowledge or because their supervision of 
internal control over financial reporting is weak (Aier et al. 2005; Li et al. 2010). Greater CFO 
financial expertise can lead to appropriate implementation of accounting rules and effective 
monitoring of accounting systems, thereby preventing unintentional misreporting.    
H3: Restating companies experiencing CFO turnover and correcting accounting errors are 
more likely to hire new CFOs with greater financial expertise than are control firms hiring 
new CFOs.  
We test H3 by contrasting the subset of restatement companies having CFO turnover and 
correcting accounting errors with a control sample of non-restatement companies having CFO 
turnover. 
It is an open question whether firms restating irregularities can benefit, to the same extent as 
firms restating errors, by hiring new CFOs having better financial expertise. Lack of CFO 
financial expertise is not the underlying cause of intentional earnings manipulations. Feng et al. 
(2011) investigate a sample of companies sanctioned for accounting irregularities in SEC 
accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) and conclude that irregularities typically 
occur when CFOs yield to pressure from CEOs. Feng et al. (2011) also find that CFOs of firms 
engaging in material accounting manipulations are more likely to be CPAs than those of control 
firms. They suggest that compliant CFOs who are CPAs are better able to come up with 
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accounting schemes to boost earnings.
35
 If irregularities are disproportionately committed by 
CFOs having high financial expertise, we might not observe improved expertise among CFOs 
newly hired by such companies. However, Feng et al. (2011) do not focus on CFO financial 
expertise, they report their CPA results in a footnote (fn. 29), and they do not study the expertise 
of CFOs hired by companies following public disclosure that they have corrected accounting 
irregularities. 
Accounting irregularities are associated with increased uncertainty and risk among investors 
and analysts (Palmrose et al. 2004; Wu 2002). As a result, these companies are likely to desire to 
repair their reputations and to reduce the likelihood of future irregularities. We argue that one 
way restatement firms can achieve this goal is by hiring CFOs having better financial expertise. 
CFOs with greater financial expertise may have better knowledge of and commitment to 
professional ethics and might suffer more reputational costs if caught in earnings manipulations. 
CFOs having better reputations to protect are likely to be more resistant to pressure from CEOs. 
These factors could result in less aggressive financial reporting by CFOs with more financial 
expertise. Given the countervailing arguments regarding the association between CFO financial 
expertise and irregularities, we do not have a strong directional expectation. Therefore, our 
hypothesis in null form is: 
H4: Restating companies experiencing CFO turnover and correcting accounting 
irregularities are not more or less likely to hire new CFOs with greater financial expertise 
than are control firms hiring new CFOs.  
                                                             
35 More broadly, Ge et al. (2011)  study whether individual CFO characteristics, including CPA status, affect 
companies’ financial reporting choices. They report only “limited evidence of the impact of these observable CFO 
characteristics on CFOs’ reporting choices, suggesting that these common and observable characteristics capture 
only a small portion of CFO styles” (Ge et al. (2011, 1176)). Their results do not imply that CFO characteristics 
such as CPA status are irrelevant in specific situations, such as irregularities. 
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We test H4 by contrasting the subset of restatement companies having CFO turnover and 
correcting accounting irregularities with a control sample of non-restatement companies having 
CFO turnover. 
 
III. SAMPLE AND MODELS 
The restatements studied in our paper are limited to those correcting accounting errors and 
irregularities made by companies reporting under U.S. GAAP.
36
  Multiple disclosures concerning 
one restatement event are treated as one restatement. Since the restatement characteristics are an 
important consideration in our analyses, we begin with restatements available in Audit Analytics, 
i.e., companies trading on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. These publicly traded companies 
are also likely to be included in Compustat, which we need for several control variables. 
Our sample period begins with restatements announced by U.S. companies in 2003, after 
SOX was enacted, and continues through 2010. Our choice of starting date tends to bias against 
the results we hypothesize because misstatements corrected post-SOX tend to be less serious, 
and the restatements generate smaller market responses, than pre-SOX restatements.
37
 Subject to 
these criteria, we identify 5,605 restatement announcements; 744 with other restatement data 
necessary for our analyses and with a CFO turnover within 12 months following restatement 
announcements for our analyses. We identify CFO turnover within 12 months following the 
announcement of the restatement for the treatment sample.
38
  
                                                             
36 Restatements that are made to correct content other than errors or irregularities  in financial statements are 
eliminated from our sample. For example, some companies use the word “restate” to present changes in accounting 
principles or retrospective revisions to enhance the consistency of their financial information. Those observations 
are not the focus of this study and, therefore, are eliminated from our sample. Restatements made by foreign filers 
to reformulate financial information under U.S. GAAP also are eliminated. 
37 Post-SOX restatements commonly involve lower dollar amounts, unintentional errors, and noncore accounts, 
compared to pre-SOX restatements (Scholz 2008). 
38 Prior restatement studies use different turnover windows surrounding restatements and lack a consensus on the 
preferred turnover window. Hennes et al. (2008) use a 13-month window (six months before through six months 
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Similar to Collins et al. (2009) and Desai et al. (2006), we adopt a matched-pairs design to 
conduct our analyses.
39
 We use propensity score matching in order to obtain an appropriate 
control sample for our treatment sample. As our study focuses on improvement in CFO 
characteristics after a restatement announcement, the appropriate control group would be those 
firms that experience a CFO turnover and have similar predicted probabilities of a restatement as 
our treatment sample. We use the following logistic regression model to predict the probability 
of a restatement based on commonly used determinants found in the accounting literature: 
RES = β0 + β1LNASSET + β2 EMPLOY + β3LOSS + β4 ROA + β5SPECIAL + β6 FNDSRSED  
+ β7ACQUIS + β8BKMKT + β9 IINTCOV + β10 LEVRG + β11 BIGN + ε; 
RES  Equals 1 if the restatement is announced in year t. 
LNASSET Natural logarithm of total assets in year t; 
EMPLOY Total number of employees in thousands, as an additional measure of firm 
size in year t; 
      LOSS Equals 1 if income before depreciation of restating firm is less than 0 in 
the fiscal year-end prior to restatement announcements, 0 otherwise; 
ROA Return on Assets = Operating Income Before Depreciation/[(Total assets 
in year t + Total assets in year t-1)/2]; 
SPECIAL Special items in year t/ Total assets in year t; 
FNDSRESED      Measure of the need for financing that equals 1 if the sum of new long 
term debt plus new equity exceeds 20% of total assets, and 0 otherwise; 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
after the restatement month) in their primary analysis and six months before through two years after in their other 
tests. Collins et al. (2010) adopt a 24-month window after the restatement. We do not use long windows due to 
concern about introducing noise into the analysis via mis-classification of non-restatement related turnover as 
restatement-related.   
39 We match each restatement company having CFO turnover with a similar non-restatement company having CFO 
turnover. We employ a matched sample rather than a larger control sample due to the cost of hand-collecting data 
on CFO characteristics. 
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ACQUIS Equals 1 if the sales contribution from acquisitions represents 20% or 
more of total sales, 0 otherwise. 
BKMKT The ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity; 
IINTCOV The inverse of the interest coverage ratio calculated as interest expense 
divided by operating income before depreciation with the ratio capped at a 
value of 2; 
LEVRG Total debt divided by total assets; 
BIGN Equals 1 for Big-N auditor during the year t, and 0 otherwise. 
 
We use all available observations from Audit Analytics and Compustat for years 2003 to 
2010. Once we obtain the predicted probabilities of a restatement, we sort the predicted 
probabilities into two groups: 1) restatement firms that experience a CFO turnover within 12 
months after announcement (treatment group) and 2) firms that experience a CFO turnover, but 
have not been associated with a restatement (control group). We then do a one to one match 
based on the year of the new CFO appointment and whether the predicted probabilities between 
the two groups are within five percent. Untabulated results indicate that the difference in means 
and medians of the predicted probability of a restatement for the treatment and control groups are 
not statistically significant.  The propensity score matching process allows us to have treatment 
and control samples that have both experienced CFO turnovers and have the same predicted 
probability of a restatement. This enables us to test the impact of an actual restatement on a 
firm’s decision to appoint a new CFO with increased accounting and/or finance qualifications.     
Table 1 provides a reconciliation of our sample. We exclude a number of firms for several 
reasons. Specifically, we exclude 382 observations having no match with non-restatement firms 
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that had CFO turnovers; 136 observations for which we could not find background information 
for their departing CFOs; 44 observations with missing variables in Compustat; and 102 
observations with missing data in CRSP. After these screens, our final sample is composed of 80 
restating firms, which we then match with 80 non-restating firms having CFO turnover.   
(Insert Table 1 here.) 
To examine the association between earnings restatements and the likelihood of CFO 
qualification improvement (H1), we use logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of financial 
expertise improvement; the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 for financial expertise 
improvement of newly-hired CFOs compared to those whom they replace and 0 otherwise. We 
model CFO financial expertise improvement as a function of a dichotomous restatement variable 
and control variables which prior research identifies as important determinants of CFO 
improvement. Our model can be summarized as follows: 
 
Pr(CFO_QUAL_IMPROVE)= β0 + β1 RESTATEMENT + β2LnASSET + β3LEVERAGE  
+ β4ROA + β5GROWTH + β6 EWRETD_BF  
+ β7OLDCFOEXP  + ε.    (1) 
The dependent variable, CFO qualification improvement (CFO_QUAL_IMPROVE), is 
tested separately using each of the following three proxy dependent variables.
40
 
ACCTIMPROVE = 1 if a new CFO is hired and has more accounting knowledge than 
the CFO replaced (i.e. has a CPA license or has public accounting 
firm working experience), 0 otherwise; 
 
EXPIMPROVE = 1 if a new CFO is hired and has more CFO working experience 
than the CFO replaced, 0 otherwise; 
                                                             
40 The three measures of CFO qualification improvement are drawn from Li et al. (2010), model (3).  
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CFOIMPROVE = 1 if a new CFO is hired and has both more accounting knowledge 
and more CFO working experience than the CFO replaced, 0 
otherwise. 
 
The control variables are defined as follows: 
RESTATEMENT               = 1 if company restates its financial statements in year t, 0 
otherwise; 
LnASSET  Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1; 
 
LEVERAGE  Total debt divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1; 
 
ROA   Return on assets for the fiscal year t-1; 
 
GROWTH  Sales growth from t-2 to t-1, i.e., (salest-1–salest-2)/salest-2; 
 
EWRETD_BF  Market-adjusted buy and hold return for fiscal year t-1; 
 
OLDCFOEXP  Natural logarithm of the number of years (working experience) 
the old CFO has held a CFO position. 
                               
Under H1, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient of our test variable RESTATEMENT, 
consistent with our hypothesis that restatement firms have a strong incentive to restore credibility 
by hiring CFOs having improved financial expertise. For control variables, we expect companies 
to be better able to improve their CFO qualification if they are larger (LnASSET), and 
financially stronger (small LEVERAGE, greater ROA, GROWTH and EWRETD_BF). 
Companies having more qualified predecessor CFOs (OLDCFOEXP) are less likely to be able to 
hire improved CFOs, leading to a negative expected coefficient for this variable.  
To examine the influence on CFO qualification improvement of the materiality of earnings 
restatements (H2), we restrict our analysis to restating firms only. The logistic regression model 
for testing H2 is as follows: 
Pr(CFO_QUAL_IMPROVE) = β0 + β1AMOUNT + β2REVENUE + β3NACCOUNTS +  
β4YRS + β5INCOME+ β6PRESS + β7REGINVEST + 
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β8LnASSET + β9LEVERAGE + β10ROA+  β11GROWTH + 
β12EWRETD_BF + β13OLDCFOEXP +ε.      (2) 
The dependent variable, representing CFO qualification improvement, consists of the 
same three variants as in model (1). The new explanatory variables are as follow.
41
  
AMOUNT  = Restated net income (loss) minus originally reported net income 
(loss) over the restated period, scaled by total assets reported at 
fiscal year-end prior to the restatement announcement; 
 
REVENUE 
 
 = 1 if a restatement involves revenue recognition issues, and 0 
otherwise; 
 
NACCOUNTS  = Number of account groups restated in a restatement. The seven 
account groups are revenue, cost of goods sold, operating expenses, 
one-time/special items, merger-related, non-operating expenses and 
other items; 
 
YRS  = Number of years restated, where a fiscal year equals 1 and each 
additional quarter equals 0.25; 
 
PRESS  = 1 if a restatement is first disclosed by press releases or 8-K, and 0 
otherwise; 
 
REGINVEST  = 1 if the SEC, PCAOB or other regulatory body is investigating 
the restating company, 0 otherwise. 
 
We conjecture that more material restatements motivate firms to hire new CFOs with greater 
financial expertise because more material restatements are associated with more negative 
outcomes for restating companies, such as negative returns and lawsuits (Palmrose et al. 2004; 
Palmrose and Scholz 2004). We use three variables (AMOUNT, NACCOUNTS, and YRS) to 
proxy for restatement materiality and expect positive coefficients for all of them. Prior 
restatement studies (Desai et al. 2006) have shown that revenue recognition restatements are 
associated with more negative returns so we include a dichotomous variable proxying for the 
                                                             
41 The other control variables such as LnASSET, LEVERAGE and GROWTH are previously defined. 
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type of misstatement (REVENUE). We also control for whether sources external to the firm 
identified misstatements, proxied by PRESS and REGINVEST. Prior work suggests that external 
identification of a misstatement indicates management’s inability to properly monitor and control 
the company. Thus, we expect positive coefficients for PRESS and REGINVEST.   
To examine the influence on CFO qualification improvement of the nature of the 
misstatements corrected (errors under H3 versus irregularities under H4), we estimate the 
following logit regression: 
Pr(CFO_QUAL_IMPROVE) = β0 + β1 TYPE + β2LnASSET + β3LEVERAGE + β4ROA + 
β5GROWTH + β6 EWRETD_BF + β7OLDCFOEXP  + ε. (3/4) 
TYPE represents the type of misstatement, error or fraud, as defined below. To test H3, we 
employ the following variable as TYPE: 
TYPE  = 1 if a company discloses in its filings or press release that the 
misstatements are due to errors, and 0 otherwise; 
   To test H4, the TYPE variable is: 
TYPE  = 1 if a company discloses in its filings or press release that the 
misstatements are due to fraud or irregularities, and 0 otherwise; 
 
In Model (3), we expect the positive sign of TYPE’s coefficient while in Model (4) we do 
not predict the sign of TYPE’s coefficient due to competing theories with opposite implications. 
The control variables have been described previously.  
IV. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. To mitigate the impact of outliers, all variables 
are winsorized at the bottom and top one percent. All variables are measured one year prior to 
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the restatement announcement.
42
 Panel A of Table 2 compares the 80 restating firms to the 
control sample. The variables listed are employed in model (1) to test H1. The mean tests 
indicate restating firms have less qualified CFOs, as proxied by less working experience as CFOs 
(OLDCFOEXP). The proportions of restating companies hiring better qualified CFOs, as proxied 
by more accounting knowledge (ACCTIMPROVE) and overall better qualification 
(CFOIMPROVE), are both 0.268 compared to 0.192 for the control firms. However, the 
difference in means is not significant. This does not provide support to H1. Moreover, the 
proportion of restating companies hiring better qualified CFOs, proxied by more working 
experience (EXPIMPROVE), is 0.342 compared to 0.423 for the control sample. While this is 
contradictory to H1, this difference is not significant. 
Panel B of Table 2 compares restatement characteristics of 20 restating firms hiring better 
qualified new CFOs (i.e., CFOs with both better accounting credentials and more experience as a 
CFO) to 60 restating firms whose new CFOs are less improved. The variables listed are 
employed in models (2), (3) and (4) to test H2-H4. Univariate analysis indicates that the number 
of restated accounts (NACCOUNTS) is positively related to hiring better qualified new CFOs 
among restating firms, which is consistent with H2. Regulatory investigation (REGINVEST) is 
negatively related to hiring better qualified CFOs among restating firms, which is unexpected.  
 
The effect of restatement on change in CFO qualifications (H1) 
Table 3 reports model (1) tests of determinants of qualifications improvement among newly 
hired CFOs. The models are estimated using a matched-pairs sample (matched on the likelihood 
of a restatement) of 160 companies that have CFO turnover from 2003 to 2010 and for which 
                                                             
42 We also test our analysis with all variables measured in the year of the restatement announcement. The results 
remain similar. 
118 
 
required data are available. RESTATE, the test variable, is positively and marginally associated 
with two measures of CFO improvement, accounting knowledge (ACCTIMPROVE) and overall 
CFO qualification (CFOIMPROVE) (p < 0.10). However, the result is not significant for the 
measure of CFO working experience improvement (EXPIMPROVE). The results provide 
modest support for our H1 that restating companies are more likely to hire improved CFOs than 
are non-restating companies experiencing CFO turnover.  
The effect of restatement characteristics on change in CFO qualifications (H2-H4) 
Table 4 reports logistic regression results for the test of hypothesis H2. The analysis uses the 
sample of 80 restating companies for which required data is available. In model (2), with 
CFOIMPROVE as the dependent variable, our test variables are AMOUNT, NACCOUNTS, and 
YRS, none of which have significant coefficients. In fact, the coefficient for REVENUE has a 
negative sign (p < 0.01), which is contradictory to H2. Thus, we find no support for H2 that 
firms restating more material restatement are more likely to hire new CFOs with greater 
accounting credentials and more CFO experience (CFOIMPROVE). ROA and OLDCFOEXP 
both have significantly negative coefficients (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively), suggesting 
that, as predicted, CFO improvement is negatively associated with firm performance and prior 
CFO experience. The results also indicate that GROWTH has a significant negative coefficient 
(p < 0.10) suggesting that faster growing firms are less likely to experience CFO improvement. 
EWRETD_BF is significantly positive (p < 0.01), suggesting that firms with better stock market 
performance are more likely to experience CFO improvement. 
Table 5 reports logistic regression results for the test of hypotheses H3 and H4. In model (3), 
TYPE (ERROR) has a positive coefficient but is not statistically significant. In model (4), we fail 
to find TYPE (FRAUD) to be significantly related to CFO overall qualification improvement 
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(CFOIMPROVE). As a result, we find no evidence supporting H3 and H4 that firms restating for 
accounting errors/irregularities are more/less motivated to hire new CFOs with greater financial 
expertise in accounting experience and CFO work experience (CFOIMPROVE). The pattern of 
the results for the control variables is similar to that of model two except that GROWTH is no 
longer significant and the significance levels are generally lower in models (3) and (4) than in 
model (2). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we examine CFO qualification improvement associated with restatements and 
restatement characteristics (restatement materiality). Our study is motivated by recent high-
profile financial scandals and increasing instances of restatements which focus public attention 
on the role of CFOs in maintaining the integrity and quality of corporate financial reporting. Our 
results provide some (albeit weak) support that restating firms are more likely to hire new CFOs 
with greater accounting knowledge and overall CFO qualification (both accounting knowledge 
and CFO work experience) than non-restating firms. Furthermore, we also find that the number 
of restating years has a positive effect on CFO qualification improvement. Although we fail to 
find strong evidence for our hypotheses, we provide the first evidence on the relation between 
CFO qualification improvement and restatement. 
The study has limitations, suggesting future research. The study is exploratory in nature and 
is an early attempt to lay out the empirical relations between variables that are likely to be 
important. Future research could explore the relation using additional control variables and 
modeling methods. Second, we examine the years in the post-SOX period. Further research can 
examine the relation in the pre-SOX period. As we discuss above, the evidence may be stronger 
since the restatements are more severe in the pre-SOX period than in the post period. Finally, due 
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to data availability, our sample size is small. Future research could extend the sample to perform 
gain more powerful tests.  
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Table 1 Sample Selection 
Sample reconciliation 
  
Restatements with CFO turnover within 12 months of the restatement 744 
Less:   
Observations having no match with non-restatement firms that had CFO turnovers 382 
Observations for which no or incomplete background information for leaving CFOs 
was found 136 
Observations not in the Compustat Databases 44 
Observations not in the CRSP Databases 102 
Final Sample 80 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Restating vs. Non-restating Companies      
 Restate (1,0)  Restate (1,0)  
 
1=restated 0=did not  
restate 
1=restated 0=did not  
restate 
 N=80 N=80  N=80 N=80  
  Mean Mean t-stat. Median Median z-stat.
a
 
ACCTIMPROVE 0.268 0.192 1.14    
EXPIMPROVE 0.342 0.423 -1.06    
CFOIMPROVE 0.268 0.192 1.14    
LnASSET 6.254 5.505 2.41** 6.132 5.375 2.84*** 
LEVERAGE 0.230 0.192 0.93 0.223 0.092 1.89** 
ROA  0.051 0.011 1.06 0.094 0.045 2.21** 
GROWTH 0.070 0.137 -0.57 0.055 0.101 1.58 
EWRETD_BF 0.008 0.040 -0.34 -0.049 -0.006 0.95 
OLDCFOEXP 1.185 1.429 -1.65*    
       
 
Panel B: Restating Companies changing CFOs: new CFOs do/do not have clearly improved 
qualifications 
  CFOIMPROVE (=1,0)   CFOIMPROVE (=1,0)   
 1=Improved 0=Not improved 1=Improved 0=Not improved 
 N=20 N=60  N=20 N=60  
  Mean Mean t-stat. Median Median z-stat. 
AMOUNT 0.7727 0.7667 0.06 0.773 0.767 1.23* 
REVENUE 0.1818 0.2167 0.34    
NACCOUNTS 1.0000 0.9333 -2.05** 1.000 1.000 0.06 
YRS 0.6364 0.5500 0.70 0.636 0.550 -0.70 
PRESS 0.0909 0.1167 - 0.33    
REGINVEST 0.0000 0.1167 -2.79***    
FRAUD 0.0455 0.0333 0.24    
LnASSET 5.943 6.369 -0.82 5.696 6.297 -0.99 
LEVERAGE 0.252 0.222 0.48 0.245 0.217 0.50 
ROA  -0.037 0.083 -2.35** 0.013 0.115 -2.97*** 
GROWTH 0.021 0.087 -0.97 0.035 0.056 0.00 
EWRETD_BF 0.086 -0.021 0.74 0.146 -0.069 1.49* 
OLDCFOEXP 0.948 1.272 -1.65*       
 
 
 
a 
Tests of differences in medians are not presented for dichotomous variables. 
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ACCTIMPROVE = 1 if a new CFO is hired and has more accounting knowledge than 
the CFO replaced (i.e. has a CPA license or has public accounting 
firm working experience), 0 otherwise; 
EXPIMPROVE = 1 if a new CFO is hired and has more CFO working experience 
than the CFO replaced, 0 otherwise; 
CFOIMPROVE = 1 if a new CFO is hired and has both more accounting knowledge 
and more CFO working experience than the CFO replaced, 0 
otherwise. 
RESTATEMENT               =1 if company restates its financial statements in year t, 0 otherwise; 
LnASSET Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1; 
LEVERAGE Total debt divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1; 
ROA   Return on assets for the fiscal year t-1; 
GROWTH Sales growth from t-2 to t-1, i.e., (salest-1–salest-2)/salest-2; 
EWRETD_BF Market-adjusted buy and hold return for fiscal year t-1; 
OLDCFOEXP Natural logarithm of the number of years the old CFO has held a 
CFO position. 
AMOUNT  = Restated net income (loss) minus originally reported net income 
(loss) over the restated period, scaled by total assets reported at fiscal 
year-end prior to restatement announcements; 
REVENUE 
 
 = 1 if a restatement involves revenue recognition issues, and 0 
otherwise; 
NACCOUNTS  = Number of account groups restated in a restatement. The seven 
account groups are revenue, cost of goods sold, operating expenses, 
one-time/special items, merger-related, non-operating expenses and 
other items; 
YRS  = Number of years restated, where a fiscal year = 1 and each 
additional quarter = 0.25; 
PRESS  = 1 if a restatement is first disclosed by press releases or 8-K, and 0 
otherwise; 
REGINVEST  = 1 if the SEC, PCAOB or other regulatory body is investigating the 
restating company, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3 
Logistic regression results explaining new CFO qualifications improvement. 
  +/- Model (1a) DepVar=   Model (1b) DepVar=   Model (1c) DepVar= 
  ACCTIMPROVE(H1)  EXPIMPROVE(H1)  CFOIMPROVE(H1) 
Variables   Coefficient Wald 
X
2
  
  Coefficient Wald X
2
    Coefficient Wald 
X
2
  
Intercept ? -1.205 2.664  -0.242 0.139  0.738 2.664 
RESTATE + 0.490 1.530*  -0.368 1.100  0.396 1.530* 
LnASSET + -0.044 0.160  0.020 0.044  0.110 0.160 
LEVERAGE + 0.015 0.000  -1.113 1.765*  0.885 0.000 
ROA  - -0.141 0.043  0.458 0.398  0.679 0.043 
GROWTH ? -0.098 0.113  -0.244 0.500  0.292 0.113 
EWRETD_BF ? 0.161 0.275  0.866 6.363***  0.306 0.275 
OLDCFOEXP - 0.005 0.001  0.022 0.014  0.209 0.001 
          
Total Obs  160   160   160  
CFO Improvement 
Obs 
 37   61   37  
Chi-square  1.912   10.083   1.912  
Psuedo R
2
   0.018     0.106     0.018   
***, **, *, designates significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively (one-tailed for signed expectations 
and two-tailed for unsigned expectations). See table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4 
Logistic regression results explaining restatement characteristics on new CFO qualifications 
improvement. 
    Model (2) DepVar=CFOIMPROVE(H2) 
   
Variables +/- Coefficient Wald X
2
  
Intercept ? -15.616 0.001 
AMOUNT + 0.194 0.047 
REVENUE + -2.919 6.529 
NACCOUNTS + 15.491 0.001 
YRS + 0.981 1.563 
PRESS + 1.515 1.191 
REGINVEST + -22.849 0.004 
FRAUD ? 
  LnASSET + 0.181 0.980 
LEVERAGE + -1.751 0.921 
ROA  - -11.028 9.484 
GROWTH + -3.207 3.343 
EWRETD_BF - 2.430 6.811 
OLDCFOEXP - -0.854 3.981 
    
Total Obs  80  
CFO Improvement Obs  20  
Chi-square  15.903  
Psuedo R
2
   0.504   
***, **, *, designates significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively (one-tailed for 
signed expectations and two-tailed for unsigned expectations). See table 2 for variable 
definitions. 
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Table 5 
Logistic regression results explaining errors vs. fraud on new CFO qualifications improvement. 
  +/- Model (3) DepVar= +/- Model (4) DepVar=   
  CFOIMPROVE(H2)  CFOIMPROVE(H4))  
Variables Coefficient Wald 
X
2
  
  Coefficient Wald 
X
2
  
  
Intercept ? -1.406 2.976 ? -1.283 2.444  
TYPE + 0.430 1.133 ? 0.732 0.329  
LnASSET + -0.011 0.008 + 0.010 0.007  
LEVERAGE + 0.107 0.023 + 0.212 0.095  
ROA  - -0.757 0.408 - -0.757 0.429  
GROWTH + 0.066 0.126 + 0.050 0.068  
EWRETD_BF - 0.241 0.662 - 0.240 0.637  
OLDCFOEXP - 0.020 0.005 - -0.026 0.007  
        
Total Obs 160   160   
CFO Improvement Obs 37   37   
Chi-square 2.218   1.322   
Psuedo R
2
 0.021     0.012     
***, **, *, designates significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively (one-tailed 
for signed expectations and two-tailed for unsigned expectations). See table 2 for 
variable definitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
